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I. INTRODUCTION

Everyone, it seems, wants to improve the quality of issued patents. Over the last decade, legal scholars from every comer have
come forward to decry the unacceptably high number of invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and
to suggest reforms to reduce it.1 Some commentators have sought to
improve the USPTO itself, calling for more funding, better administrative oversight, and changes to the way individual patent examiners
are compensated. 2 Others have looked to third parties, seeking to
make it easier for competitors and members of the public to submit
prior art and participate in opposition proceedings.3 Whatever the
means, these reforms share a common and urgent goal: making the
examination process more effective at identifying and rejecting lowquality patent applications. 4
However, none of these proposals have focused on improving the
quality of the applications themselves. Applications (of whatever
1.See generally Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative
PatentReview Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and
Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002); Michael
Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in the U.S. Patent System: A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 1 (2010), available at

https ://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review/online/
meehan-increasing-certainty.pdf; Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents
Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) [hereinafter Merges, Six Impossible Patents]; Joseph S.
Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express
Lanes
Proposalsfor Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 119 (2005); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the PatentSystem:
A Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (200 1).
2. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 34-35
(2004); Mark A. Lemley, Can the Patent Office Be Fixed?, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.

REV. 295, 297-304 (2011); Thomas, supra note 1,at 323-26.
3. See Kesan, supra note 1,at 776-77; Jay Kesan & Andres Gallo, Why "'Bad"Patents
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?
The Private and Social Costs of
Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 107-12 (2006); Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 1,at

604-05; Thomas, supra note 1,at 326-32, 340-44. Similar reforms were recently included
in the America Invents Act. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§§ 6, 8, 125 Stat. 284, 299-313, 315-16 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter AIA] (reforming post-grant review proceedings and creating avenues for third
parties to submit prior art during examination).
4. But see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.

1495, 1508-11 (2001) (suggesting the cost of increased scrutiny may outweigh its benefits).
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form) are taken as a given, and the real work of ensuring patent quality is thought to start when one shows up at the door of the USPTO.
Commentators have recognized that patent applicants sometimes possess useful information, 5 but beyond suggesting a few mechanisms to6
encourage applications to pass that information along to examiners,
scholars have not asked applicants to do much else. The possibility
that applicants might have a more direct role to play in improving
patent quality has gone largely unexplored.
This is a significant oversight. Applicants are particularly wellplaced to influence and improve patent quality. Applicants, after all,
are the ones who draft the claims that will later be examined by the
USPTO and litigated by others. They often understand their inventions better than anyone else. They may possess the best knowledge
of relevant prior art.8 And they often have a substantial investment in
the outcome of their applications. Indeed, a conservative estimate is
that patent applicants spent about $7.5 billion pursuing patents in
2012dwarfing the approximately $1.4 billion the USPTO spent
examining applications the same year. 9 To ignore applicants, then, is
5. See Kesan, supra note 1, at 768; R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 212-14 (2002); Mark A.
Lemley, Fixing the Patent Office 10-11 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper
No. 422, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=2023958.
6. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 1, at 770, 773-77; Mark A. Lemley et al., What to Do
About Bad Patents?, 28 REGULATION 10, 12-13 (2005); Osenga, supra note 1, at 141-51.
In addition, several commentators have noted ways that existing patent rules fail to incentivize, or actively disincentivize, applicants to disclose relevant information to the USPTO. See
Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 804-06
(2011); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2135, 2149 (2009) [hereinafter Wagner, Patent-Quality Mechanisms]; Wagner, supra note
5, at 214-15; Michael C. Deane, Note, Aligning the Incentives to Disclosure of Relevant
Information to the USPTO: How the Jury Instruction Standards in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i
Could Aid the Examination Process, 92 TUx. L. REV. 439 (2013).
7. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 753 (2009); Ronald J. Mann & Marian Underweiser, A
New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (2012); Miller, supra note 1, at 733-34 (noting resource advantage of
applicants over USPTO).
8. See Cotropia, supra note 7, at 751, 753-54; Kesan, supra note 1, at 768 (observing that
valuable information about prior art is often in the hands of the patent applicant); Jay P.
Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose PriorArt, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 23, 52 (2000).
9. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2013,
at
80-81
(2013),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2013PAR.pdf. The approximation of
applicants' costs is based on an estimate that a patent applicant spends approximately
$ 15,000 in attorneys' fees over the course of prosecution, see Lemley, supra note 4, at
1498-99 & n.13, and USPTO data showing that between 2010 and 2012, approximately
505,000 utility applications were filed per year, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
supra, at 189. The result - $ 7.575 billion - is of a similar order of magnitude to that of
Lemley's estimate that $ 4.33 billion were spent on patent applications in 2000. See Lemley,
supra note 4, at 1499; see also AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 27 (2013) (reporting that the median attorneys' fees for preparation of
an original application for relatively complex patent was between $ 8500 and $ 10,000 in
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to neglect a group that could have a significant effect on patent quality.
Perhaps one reason for this neglect is that many scholars assume
that applicants want the kind of vague, overbroad, or otherwise lowquality patents that patent reformers are seeking to prevent. Understandably, some commentators regard applicants with suspicion; after
all, applicants are attempting to claim private property rights instead
of allowing their inventions to enter the public domain. Given applicants' inherent self-interest, it is reasonable to suppose that they will
generally try to obtain the broadest patent rights possible. ° This suspicion, in turn, leads to an adversarial view of patent prosecution: applicants will seek broad, low-quality patents, and it is the role of the
USPTO (and the occasional third-party intervenor) to push them back.
However, while it is true that a broader patent is generally more
likely to be infringed, this benefit is subject to a critical constraint: a
claim that is too broad runs the risk of being invalid, and may fare no
better in litigation than a claim that is too narrow." Because a successful patent infringement suit requires prevailing on both validity
and infringement, an applicant may have just as much to lose from her
claim being too broad as she does from her claim being too narrow.12
Beyond a certain point, the broader the claim, the less valuable it becomes. And as a claim's likelihood of being valid continues to diminish, its value may become so low that the expected costs of filing it
may start to outweigh its expected benefits . 13
This insight shifts the conventional view of applicants in a subtle
but important way. Applicants do not seek overbroad claims because
they are inherently the most valuable claims, but rather because current prosecution and litigation rules cause the expected value of these
claims to exceed their expected cost. 14 Enlisting applicants' help to
improve patent quality therefore does not require a complete revamping of the current ex parte prosecution system. Instead, improving
patent quality could simply be a matter of increasing the costs and

2012); David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 677, 689 (2012) (estimating that attorneys' fees for preparation of an initial application
range from $ 11,000 to $ 15,000).
10. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 9, at 687; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 840 (1990). Also,

other commentators have noted applicants' interest in obtaining malleable or otherwise
vague claims. See Wagner, Patent-QualityMechanisms, supra note 6, at 2147-51.
11. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 102, 103 (2012). Claims that are declared invalid are frequently so declared because they are too broad. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 185, 207-08 (1998).

12. A variety of reasons why a patentee may prefer claims that are too broad over claims
that are too narrow or vice versa are discussed in Parts II.B, ID, V.B, infra.
13. A variety of factors that influence the expected cost of filing a claim are discussed in
Parts I1A, II.C, IV.A, IV.B, infra.

14. See infra Parts HA, II.B.
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reducing the benefits of low quality claims, so that applicants will on
average file fewer of such claims in the first instance.
As this Article explains, the appeal of overbroad claims can be
reduced in a variety of ways. Some of these reforms are simple - for
example, changing the structure of the fees paid to the USPTO to ensure that applicants weigh the incremental costs and benefits of each
claim that they file.1 5 Others are more elaborate - for example, flipping litigation presumptions to make narrow claims more valuable
than broad ones. 6 In between is a range of proposals to adjust
appli17
cant incentives in favor of narrower and higher quality claims.
This Article proceeds in six parts, starting with this Introduction.
Part II provides background regarding current problems of patent
quality and the reforms that have been previously proposed to address
the issue. Part III examines how current patent rules may affect applicants' incentives to seek particular kinds of claims. Part IV proposes
several changes to patent law that could be expected to increase applicants' incentives to seek narrower claims and to reduce their incentives to seek broader ones. Part V raises and addresses several
objections to the assumptions relied on in Parts III and IV. Part VI
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
The process of acquiring a patent starts by an inventor filing an
application at the USPTO. The applicant files a description of her invention and a declaration that she in fact invented it, and pays a fee. 18
She must also include one or more claims. Each claim is a technical
description that provides the legal definition of what constitutes infringement of the patent. 9 Although the claims contained in the same
application are supposed to be generally related to each other, each is
a legally distinct invention that may present independent questions of
validity and infringement. 20
After the inventor files her application, she waits. Depending on
the field of her invention, that wait could last for months or years. 21
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Part JV.C.
17. See infra Parts IV.D, JV.B.
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). In some cases an application must also include an illustration. See id. § 113.
19. See id. § 112.

20. See id. §§ 282, 288 (validity of claims determined individually); Leeds & Catlin Co.
v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319 (1909) ("Claims are independent inventions. One may be infringed, others not."). By contrast, a finding of inequitable conduct
renders all the claims of a patent unenforceable. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
21. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 14 (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
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Eventually, the USPTO responds with an "office action"- a letter
indicating which of the applicant's proposed claims were found to
meet the statutory requirements for patentability and which were not.
Usually, at least some of the claims are rejected for failing to meet
those standards. 22 But, such a rejection is not the end of the road. Ra
ther, in response to a rejection, an applicant has several options: she
may attempt to persuade the examiner that the claim as written meets
the statutory requirements for patentability, she may amend the claim
in an attempt to make it satisfy those requirements, or she may (after
fulfilling certain procedural prerequisites) take an appeal. 23 This cycle
of rejection, argument, and amendment may go on for some time.24
If at any point in this process the USPTO determines that the applicant's claims meets the statutory requirements for patentability, the
USPTO will issue a notice of allowance. 25 If the applicant chooses to
proceed, she pays an additional fee, and the USPTO publishes her
patent, mails her a formal certificate, and declares her a patentee. 26
Once the patent formally issues, the applicant (now a patentee) holds
a time-limited right to exclude others from practicing the invention as
defined by her issued claims. 27
Yet despite this expensive 2 8 and time-consuming 29 investment in
pre-issuance examination, the USPTO makes mistakes. When validity
is challenged in court, roughly half of litigated patents are found to
contain one or more invalid claims. 30 And although it is unknown ex-

about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY201 1PAR.pdf (reporting average first action pendency between
twenty-five and twenty-eight months and average total pendency between thirty-one and
thirty-six months during 2007 through 2011).
22. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 2 7 (2010), available at https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/
files/stanford-technology-law-review-stir/online/lemley-sampat-examining-patent.pdf.
23. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2013) (rules for claim amendments); id. § 41.31(a) (requirements to take an appeal); Lemley & Sampat, supra note 22,
6-15 (discussing alternatives
to either arguing against a rejection or amending a claim).
24. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,
84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 71 (2004) (finding, during period of study, that prosecution took an
average of 2.47 years from earliest claimed filing date to issuance date); Lemley & Sampat,
supra note 22,
19-24 (discussing use of Requests for Continued Examinations ("RCE"s)
by applicants to extend debate over an application's rejection).
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 1300 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/

offices/pac/mpep/mpep- 1300.pdf.
26. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153 (2012).
27. See id. §§ 154, 271. Even after some claims have issued, the applicant may continue
to pursue other claims through a continuation application. See id. § 120; Lemley & Moore,
supra note 24, at 68.
28. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1499 (estimating that patent applicants spend in excess
of $ 4.3 billion a year obtaining patents).
29. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 21, at 14.
30. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 11, at 205; Mann & Underweiser, supra note 7, at
7. Note that a fifty percent rate of invalidity of litigated patents is necessarily a product of
the selection of disputes for litigation and does not imply that fifty percent of issued patents
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actly how many of the roughly two million patents in force today are
actually invalid, 3 1 there is a widespread perception among practitioners and commentators that invalid claims continue to issue from the
USPTO at an unacceptably high rate. 32
Poor patent quality - the tendency of issued patents to have one
or more invalid claims 3 3 - imposes a variety of costs. A patentee can
brandish an invalid claim to scare away competitors, increase wouldbe entrants' costs of capital, or drive away competitors' customers even if the patentee never enforces it.34 Invalid claims limit commercial freedom, deter potential innovators, and lead to wasteful legal and
technical undertakings.3 They increase uncertainty in developing in
dustr3es, and generally erode public and judicial confidence in the
patent system. Although these costs are difficult to quantify, one
estimate puts them in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually.38
A variety of reforms have been proposed to improve patent quality through better examination. Many commentators have suggested
procedural and institutional changes to improve the capabilities of the
USPTO.39 Others have looked at ways to increase participation by
are invalid. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (discussing selection bias in litigation).
31. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1501.
32. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 34-35; Kesan, supra note 1, at 765-66; Kesan
& Gallo, supra note 3, at 63-68; Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law
and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 57 (2003); Lemley,
supra note 2, at 296-97; Mann & Underweiser, supra note 7, at 1; Merges, Six Impossible
Patents, supra note 1, at 589-91; Thomas, supra note 1, at 316-22; Wagner, Patent-Quality
Mechanisms, supra note 6, at 2144-45.
33. Although other metrics of patent quality are certainly possible, see Mann & Underweiser, supra note 7, at 2-4, this Article focuses on statutory validity as the primary proxy
for patent quality.
34. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents,
91 MINN. L. REv. 101, 125-27 (2006). But see Lemley, supra note 4, at 1515-17 (suggest-

ing that costs of these "in terrorem" effects have been overstated).
35. For example, an invalid claim may lead to costly litigation, unnecessary efforts to design around the claim, and reduced competition in affected markets. See T. Randolph Beard
et al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 240, 245 (2010); Farrell & Merges, supra note 1, at 945-46; Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 1, at 592; Osenga, supra note 1, at 126-27.
36. See John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches
to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 731 (2002); Wagner, Patent-Quality Mechanisms, supra note 6, at 2140-44.
37. See Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., con-

cuffing) (noting that "potential vagueness and suspect validity of some.., patents" may
affect the availability of injunctive relief); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking
Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 72 (2007); Wagner, PatentQuality Mechanisms, supra note 6, at 2141-42, 2144-45.
38. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1507-08.
39. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 35; Lemley, supra note 2, at 297-304; Thomas, supra note 1, at 323-26. The AIA implemented reforms using similar mechanisms. See

AIA §§ 6, 22 (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (reforming USPTO's post-grant
review proceedings and requiring that patent application fees be used only for activities

relating to processing patent applications).
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third parties, such as hiring for-profit examiners, involving competitors in the review process, and making it easier for the public to oppose problematic applications. 40 A related line of proposals has
focused on improving the flow of relevant information to the government's patent examiners with mechanisms such as increased disclosure burdens on applicants, rewards for information disclosure, and
crowdsourcing of additional scientific expertise. 41
However, not everyone agrees that investing additional public and
private resources in examination is the answer. Some scholars have
suggested that the marginal benefits of increased examination cannot
justify its likely enormous marginal costs. The volume of patent applications is so massive, these commentators note, that implementing
even a modest amount of increased scrutiny could easily cost more
than a billion dollars annually. 42 And, because only a tiny fraction of
issued patents are ever licensed, litigated, or otherwise enforced, the
herculean task of improving the quality of all patents through increased scrutiny might simply be a waste.43 Along these lines, other
scholars have suggested that the key to improving the patent system is
not to increase examiner resources, but to better allocate them. Consequently, these commentators have proposed reforms that would help
the USPTO to identify the most important patents, which would allow
examiners to spend more time scrutinizing certain applications
with44
out incurring the cost of doing so for all applications.
All of these examination-based reforms share one thing in common: at root, they are proposals to improve the manner in which the
USPTO takes in patent applications and turns out issued patents.
Largely missing from the discussion, however, have been proposals to
improve the inputs to that process. Indeed, with a few notable excep40. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1576-1600 (2009); Kesan, supra note 1, at 776-77; Kesan & Gallo, supra note 3, at 107-12; Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 1, at 604-05; Thomas,
supra note 1, at 326-32, 340-44; see also AIA § 8 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012))
(allowing third parties to submit prior art during examination).
41. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 1, at 960-64; Kesan, supra note 1, at 770, 773-75;
Kesan & Banik, supra note 8, at 26, 39-41; Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 37, at 61-63
(proposing process for obtaining "gold-plated" patents that would require applicants to
search and evaluate relevant prior art); Mann & Underweiser, supra note 7, at 27; Beth
Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and PatentReform, 20 HARv. J.L. & ThCH. 123, 144-51 (2006); Thomas, supra note 1, at 340-44; Thomas, supra note 36, at 757. But see Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d

1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (expressing concern that a "tidal wave of disclosure" by applicants to the USPTO "makes identifying the most relevant prior art more difficult"); Cotropia, supra note 7, at 777-78 (cautioning that applicant's submission of irrelevant or

duplicative information might "bury" relevant material).
42. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1508-10; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 84 (2005).
43. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1510-11, 1523-24.
44. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 42, at 84-85; Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 37,
at 61-63; Meehan, supra note 1,
28-43; Osenga, supra note 1, at 141-51.
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tions discussed below, the patent literature contains hardly any analyses of how patent rules affect applicant incentives in drafting and
filing patent applications.
Several commentators have identified important ways in which
the current patent system may encourage or discourage certain types
of patent applications. For example, David Fagundes and Jonathan
Masur have observed that the cost of obtaining a patent may limit the
number of applications that have little private value, which may in
turn reduce the number of patents with low public value that can be
exploited for nuisance or hold-up.45 Scott Kieff and others have noted
that the risk of a court later invalidating a patent may cause applicants
to file narrower claims than they would if the USPTO's decision were
the final word.46 And several commentators have proposed more di
rect incentives to reduce over-claiming, such as fee-shifting, bounties,
and penalties applied during or after examination.4 In light of the
widely recognized importance of patent quality, current understandings of applicant incentives appear seriously underdeveloped.
III. APPLICANT INCENTIVES IN SELECTING CLAIM SCOPE
This Part evaluates how current patent prosecution and enforcement rules incentivize applicants to increase or reduce their risk of
filing invalid claims. Although claims can be invalid on a number of
legal grounds, 8 the emphasis of the following analysis is on claims
that are invalid because they are overbroad. A claim can be overbroad
because it describes something that was already known, 49 because it is
obvious in light of prior art, or because its scope exceeds what was
51
described and enabled
by the accompanying 52specification.
Other
...
-53
problems with validity, such as indefiniteness, lack of utility,- and
improper subject matter 5 4 are less common5 5 and typically easier for
45. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 9, at 696-701; Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens
and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 706-15 (2011) [hereinafter Masur,
Costly Screens].
46. See Kieff, supra note 32, at 102-04.
47. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 1, at 795-97; Miller, supra note 1, at 704-05; Thomas,
supra note 1, at 340-44; Thomas, supra note 36, at 745-46, 758 (noting partial success of
Japanese program to encourage prominent filers to improve application quality voluntarily);
Wagner, supra note 5, at 216-26; Note, Estopping the Madness at the PTO: Improving
Patent Administration Through Prosecution History Estoppel, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2164,
2173-75 (2003).

48. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
49. See id. § 102.
50. See id. § 103.

51. See id. §§ 282, 112(a).
52. See id. § 112(b).
53. Cf id. § 101.
54. Cf id.
55. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 11, at 208.
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the USPTO to detect. 56 Moreover, by taking some of the pressure off
the USPTO in the domain of overbroad claims, improvements to applicant incentives may allow the USPTO to devote more resources to
these other aspects of patent quality.
To begin to approach the problem of overbroad claims, this Part
focuses on patent value that derives from the ability of a patentee to
successfully assert an individual patent in an infringement suit. This
Part thus assumes a hypothetical applicant seeking to maximize the
enforcement value of her present patent application in future litigation. Several challenges to this assumption are set aside for Part V.
For example, inventors file patent applications for a variety of reasons, and some may have little or no interest in licensing or enforcement; Part V.A considers other motivations for filing patents and how
they may change the current Part's analyses. It is also possible that
some patentees may be able to obtain settlements that diverge from
expected litigation outcomes. For example, a patent holder may be
able to use the threat of even long-shot litigation to deter competitive
entrants, or to extort settlements based on the high cost of defending
patent suits. Part V.B evaluates how deviations between settlement
and litigation outcomes could affect claiming behavior. Finally, as
Polk Wagner and Gideon Parchomovsky have noted, contemporary
patent licensing and litigation often take place in the context of patent
portfolios. 58 Part V.C evaluates how patent value derived from a patent's role in a larger patent portfolio could affect the prior analyses.
The current Part proceeds in four sections. Section A uses several
basic principles of patent law to construct a model of applicants' incentives to file various kinds of claims. Section B refines that model
to account for the presumption of patent validity and explains how
that presumption affects applicants' incentives in drafting certain
claims. Section C explores the role that examination may play in applicants' selection of claims for filing. Section D notes how several
56. Many commentators have noted the steep odds against a patent examiner trying to
find the most relevant prior art. See Ethan Katsh & Beth Noveck, Peer to PeerMeets the
World of Legal Information: Encountering a New Paradigm, 99 LAw LIBR. J. 365, 367
(2007); Lemley, supra note 4, at 1500; Susan Walmsley Graf, Improving Patent Quality
Through Identification of Relevant PriorArt: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to
the Patent Office, 11 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 495, 502-04 (2007). Rejections on the

grounds of enablement are also notoriously difficult for examiners to sustain. See Sean B.
Seymore, The Presumptionof Patentability,97 MiNN. L. REV. 990, 1020-21 (2013).

57. The following analysis also assumes that applicants (or their agents) are knowledgeable about the relevant patent laws and are able to adjust their behavior accordingly. The
USPTO estimates that approximately 98.2 percent of the patent applications received in
2011 were filed by patent agents or attorneys. See E-mailfrom J. Hirabayashito R. Fernan-

do, July 18, 2013 (correspondence on file with author). Nonetheless, applicants and practitioners may sometimes fail to fully understand the relevant doctrines. See Mark D. Janis &
Timothy R. Holbrook, PatentLaw 's Audience, 97 MiNN. L. REV. 72, 73-74 (2012).
58. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, PatentPortfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 41-42 (2005).
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asymmetries in patent rules may affect applicants' preferences for
broader or narrower claims.
A. A Simplified Model of Claim Drafting
The patent system has two primary mechanisms for influencing
behavior at the application stage: First, there are rules that affect the
value an applicant can expect the claim to have if it is issued by the
patent office. Second, there are rules that affect the expected cost of
obtaining a given claim. This Section evaluates how these rules interact to influence the expected costs and benefits of filing any given
claim.
1. Claim Value as a Function of Scope
Asserting the exclusive rights bestowed by a patent grant is no
easy undertaking. After surviving potentially years of pendency before the USPTO, the patentee still faces two distinct and open questions once she gets to court: first, whether each asserted claim is in
fact valid; and second, if that claim is valid, whether it actually covers
the accused infringer's products or activities.5 9 Losing on either front
causes the infringement action to fail. Therefore, an applicant seeking
to maximize the enforcement value of her patent- whether for licensing or litigation6
must draft her claims in a way that takes into
account both the infringement value of her claims and their likelihood
of validity.
No matter how careful she is in the filing and prosecution of her
patent application, an applicant can never be sure that her claims are
actually valid. Any prior writing, published anywhere in the world,
can be used to invalidate or deny her patent. 61 Even if she conducts an
exhaustive search, she can never conclusively prove the non-existence
of potentially invalidating prior art. Moreover, searching is costly, and
62
many applicants find it undesirable to perform extensive searching.
Accordingly, while an applicant has the freedom to draft her claims as
she sees fit, she has no choice but to do so on the basis of imperfect
information.
Even though a patent applicant cannot know whether the claims
she files are actually valid, she does have a straightforward means to
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 282.
60. For a discussion of how settlements may depart from expected litigation outcomes,
see Part V.B, infra.
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
62. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1509, 1510 & n.63; lain M. Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Survey Results from the 2003 Intellectual Property Owners Association Survey on
Strategic Management of Intellectual Property, at F.8 (Oct. 2003), http://www.ipo.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/survey results revised.pdf.
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increase the odds that they are: she can file narrower claims. As an
applicant narrows a claim by adding additional claim elements, it becomes more difficult for challengers to find prior art anticipating that
claim or to find multiple references that combine to make the narrowed claim obvious. Thus, as claim scope narrows, the probability
that the claim is valid increases. 63 Conversely, as claim scope broadens, it becomes easier for alleged infringers and others to find invalidating prior art,64 and the likelihood of the claim surviving litigation
(assuming it even issues in the first place) becomes smaller and smaller.
If validity were an applicant's only concern, deciding which
claims to file would be easy. Applicants would simply draft the narrowest claims possible, and in doing so maximize the likelihood that
those claims will survive any subsequent validity challenges. 65 Of
course, an enforcement-minded applicant needs claims that are more
than simply valid. To successfully assert her patent, she will also need
to show that the defendant actually infringes one or more of her issued
claims.
When it comes to maximizing infringement value, an applicant's
incentives for selecting claim scope are the opposite of those for maximizing validity: broader claims have better chances of success, while
narrower claims are typically worse off. The narrower the claim, the
more difficult it will be to show that the accused infringer is in fact
practicing each and every element of the claim as the standard for
infringement requires. 66 Thus, the broader the claim, the more likely
that an alleged infringer will be found to infringe it, the greater the
number of potential infringers, and the more difficult it will be for

63. Invalidity based on anticipation requires that a single reference disclose all of the elements of a claim. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The obviousness
inquiry is more nuanced, but narrower claims still stand a higher chance of surviving a
challenge (all else equal), because they will tend to result in greater differences between the
patent claim and the prior art. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 24-25 (1966).
In some cases, broader claims may also raise additional difficulties under the written description or enablement requirements. See Boston Scientific v. Johnson & Johnson, 647
F.3d 1353, 1362-66 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ariad v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-51 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. 481 F.3d 1371, 1378-80 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
64. See BURTON A. AMERNICK, PATENT LAW FOR THE NONLAWYER 56 (1991); DAVID
PRESSMAN, NOLO'S PATENTS FOR BEGINNERS 232 (7th ed. 2012).
65. Of course, factors other than a claim's scope affect its likelihood of validity. For example, an applicant could hire a savvier patent attorney, file her application as quickly as
possible to avoid the risk that later publications will be legally deemed prior art, and pay
particular attention to filing technicalities that could later serve as a basis to invalidate her
patent after the fact. However, these behaviors are largely distinct from the perceived problems of patent quality and the incentives for filing broader or narrower claims. For this
reason, the following analysis assumes that these various factors are held constant.
66. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott, 946 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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those potential infringers to avoid or design around the claim. 67 While
the calculus for expected infringement value is complex, 68 it generalizes to a simple trend: as long as a claim remains valid, its expected
infringement value increases with scope. 69 As claim scope decreases,
so does the number of potential infringers, and so does the expected
infringement value of the valid claim. v
So from the perspective of applicants, narrower claims are better
for purposes of validity, while broader claims are better for purposes
of infringement. Yet for any single claim, an applicant cannot have it
both ways - a basic principle of patent law is that claims must be
construed to have the same scope for purposes of validity as they do
for purposes of infringement. Therefore, both the likelihood of validity and the expected infringement value of a claim are functions of
scope, but they tend to move in opposite directions. As scope becomes
broader, likelihood of validity decreases and expected infringement
value (assuming validity) increases.

67. See Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND. J. ECON. 52, 62
(1992) (discussing relationship between patent scope and cost of imitation).
68. The expected infringement value of a claim will depend not only on the likelihood
that any given accused product infringes that claim, but also on the value that a finding that
the product infringes will have to the patentee. For example, different infringing products
may have varying volumes of total sales, ease of design-around, profit margins, and so on,
all of which may affect the value of a finding of infringement. See Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1323-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing calculation of damages for
infringement); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158-5
(6th Cir. 1978) (same). And even if two products have the same sales volume and strategic
relationship to the patentee, the infringing feature's role in those products could significantly change the enforcement value of the patent. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 678
F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (requiring a "nexus" between the alleged infringement and
lost sales in order to obtain injunctive relief). It is also possible that the expected value of a
claim may depend on the relationship between that claim and other claims in an applicant's
portfolio. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 58, at 66.
69. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 103-07 (2004). An im-

portant caveat to this general trend is that some narrow claims may have high value to an
applicant because they read directly on a particular product and therefore have extremely
high probability of infringement in certain strategic situations, such as when an infringer has
directly copied the patent holder's product. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92
GEO. L.J. 435, 458 (2004).
70. See Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 45, at 705. To a certain extent, an applicant
may be able to substitute more narrow claims for fewer broad claims, and thereby achieve
the same infringement value she would have obtained by filing broad claims. However,
lacking perfect foresight, it may be difficult for an applicant to conceive of every possible
narrow claim necessary to approximate the coverage that could be achieved by a single
broad claim.
71. See Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("[T]he same interpretation of a claim must be applied to all validity and infringement issues in the case."); W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Having construed the claims one way for determining their validity, it is
axiomatic that the claims must be construed in the same way for infringement.").
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If losses due to invalidity and losses due to non-infringement both
have the same value to the applicant,72 a claim's expected value will
be given by
E(s) = V(s) x I(s),

(1)

where E(s) is the expected value of a claim as a function of its
scope (s), V(s) is the likelihood that a claim will be found valid as a
function of its scope, and I(s) is the expected infringement value of a
valid claim as a function of its scope.
Because the expected value of a claim depends on both its likelihood of validity and its potential to result in infringement, claim value
peaks at neither extreme of claim scope. If a claim is too narrow, it is
so unlikely that it will be found infringed that validity becomes irrelevant. At the other extreme, when a claim is too broad, it is so unlikely
that it will be found valid that the prospect of nearly universal infringement is similarly immaterial. The enforcement value peaks
somewhere in between, where the product of the claim's probability
of validity and its expected infringement value is maximized. Figure
1 illustrates this basic trend in generalized terms.

>

-

•
U

Expected
value
E(s)

Scope (s)
Figure 1: Expected Claim Value as a Function of Scope

72. This assumption might not always hold, however, since collateral estoppel makes a
finding of non-validity more harmful to an enforcement campaign than a finding of noninfringement. For the consequences of relaxing this assumption, see Part HI.D, infra.
73. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation over Second-

Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn't FitAll, How Could Two
Do The Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1937, 1961-62 (2009) (noting tension between risks of
invalidity and non-infringement as a function of claim scope).
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The x-axis of Figure 1 is oriented such that narrower claims are
on the left and broader claims are on the right. The y-axis is oriented
such that claim value increases in the positive direction.
Figure 1 depicts the general trend given in the assumptions above:
claim value tends to peak at some moderate scope somewhere in the
middle range of potential claim scopes. At the extremes, claims that
are either too narrow or too broad have their enforcement value impaired by their risk of non-infringement and invalidity, respectively.
These basic characteristics of claim value are widely recognized;
indeed, many commentators have noted that a claim's value diminishes if it is either too broad or too narrow. 7 6 However, the value of
claims as a function of their scope is only one part of the equation, for
it does not directly answer the question most critical to improving the
quality of claims through applicant incentives: given this general trend
in claim value, which claims will applicants actually file?
2. Prosecution Cost Constraints and the Selection of Claims for Filing
At first glance, one might think that applicants will draft their
claims with an eye toward hitting the peak implied above; indeed, this
may be an included goal of many patent prosecution strategies. However, it would be misleading to focus exclusively on the location of
the claim-value peak. After all, applicants are allowed to file a theoretically unlimited number of claims. If granted by the USPTO and
asserted in court, each claim will
independently on the
•- be evaluated
77
merits for both validity and infringement. In this way, an applicant
can partially hedge against the uncertainty shrouding her claim's optimal scope through claim diversification. By distributing her claims
at various points along the claim-value curve, an applicant can increase her chances that one of those claims will hit near the peak. And
because the quality of issued patents ultimately depends not only on
the strongest claims included in a particular application but also on the
weaker ones, an analysis of applicant incentives needs to consider
how patent rules affect marginal claims filed as well. S

74. None of the following analysis depends on the particular shape of the expected value
function depicted by Figure 1.
75. Subject, of course, to the various assumptions stated above.
76. See, e.g., Kieff, supra note 32, at 102-04.
77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
78. The ability of applicants to file multiple claims introduces another complication: it is
possible that there may be synergies between claims, either in the same application or across
an applicant's portfolio, such that the value of controlling the full set of claims together is
greater than the sum of the values of owning the claims individually. This situation might
arise, for example, if three claims foreclose the three feasible ways of accomplishing some
result. One limitation of the model presented in this Section is that it does not capture such

interactions across claims.
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Although applicants have the option of filing a theoretically unlimited number of claims, not every conceivable claim is necessarily
worth filing. In reality, patent prosecution budgets are limited, and
each additional claim filed will typically involve some additional filing fees, inventor time, and prosecution expenses beyond the baseline
costs of preparing the patent application. 7 9 Given these incremental
expenses, applicants will rationally seek to avoid filing claims that
have an expected value that is less than the expected marginal cost to
obtain them.80 In other words, there may be a "claim-filing cutoff'a minimum expected claim value below which an applicant will not
file a claim. Figure 2 depicts one such claim-filing cutoff. 81

-Expected

value
E(s)

-~

......... Claim!
Ucutoff

A

Bfiling

Scope (s)

Figure 2: Expected Claim Value as a Function of Scope and a ClaimFiling Cutoff

79. The additional costs of attorney and inventor time for each claim filed are difficult to
calculate at an individual level. However, it is well documented that the cost of preparing a
patent application varies greatly depending on the complexity of the application. See AM.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 27 (2013). The
additional filing fees owed to the patent office for filing additional claims are discussed in
detail in Part IV.A, infra.
80. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 9, at 696-700; Kieff, supra note 32, at 102-04;
Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 45, at 689-90 (arguing that one of the functions of examination costs is to select against patents having low private value); Merges, Six Impossible
Patents, supra note 1, at 598 (suggesting that filing fees may discourage applicants from
filing patents that are less valuable or less likely to be valid).
81. Although the claim-filing cutoff depicted in Figure 2 is flat, the cost of acquiring a
claim may actually increase as a function of claim scope due to the screening function
served by examination. See infra Part III.C.
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Claims of comparatively moderate scope have an expected value
above this cutoff, and so are candidates for filing. In the example illustrated in Figure 2, these net-positive-expected value claims are
those with scope between points A and B.8 2 In this example, the applicant will want to avoid filing claims much narrower than those around
point A or much broader than those around point B. In these outer
zones, the scope of the claim renders the claim's expected value to be
less than the expected cost of obtaining it, and thus the claim is not
worth filing.
Although there are several ways in which the current patent system departs from this simplified model, 83 this basic interaction between the expected value of a claim and its expected marginal cost is
the same. On average, the more claims an applicant chooses to file,
the more inventor and attorney time will be necessary to prepare the
application, and the greater the filing fees that will be owed to the
USPTO. And although it is difficult to quantify inventor and attorney
time on a per-claim basis, empirical research suggests that relatively
modest changes to the filing fees imposed by 84
the USPTO can have a
measurable effect on applicant filing behavior.
It may be surprising that applicants would forgo filing an additional claim (potentially worth millions of dollars) to avoid incremental prosecution costs of perhaps several hundred dollars. But the
potential benefit of having a valid and infringed claim must be heavily
discounted to reflect the risks, uncertainty, transaction costs, and years
of delay that stand between an initial patent filing and a successful
litigation or settlement. In fact, given the unlikelihood of overcoming
all of these obstacles, many have
85 questioned why so many applicants
all.
at
applications
many
so
file

82. None of the following analysis depends on the particular shape of the expected value
function or claim-filing cutoff depicted in Figure 2.
83. See infra Parts H.B, J1I.C, HI.D, IV.A.
84. See Gaetan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Role of
Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence, 27 J. OF ECON. SURV. 696, 703-07 (2013);
Dennis Crouch, Evidence Based Prosecution I: Sensitivity to Claim Fee Variation,
PATENTLY-0 (Sept. 21, 2006), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2006/09/patent prosecut.html
[hereinafter Crouch, Evidence Based Prosecution: Sensitivity to Claim Fee Variation];
Dennis Crouch, Sensitivity to USPTO Fees, PATENTLY-0
(Oct. 1, 2008),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/sensitivity-to.html [hereinafter Crouch, Sensitivity to
USPTO Fees].
85. Fewer than two percent of issued patents are asserted in court, and estimates of the
percentage of patents licensed are similarly in the single digits. See Lemley, supra note 4, at
1501, 1507. Many prior commentators have observed and attempted to address this apparent
puzzle. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1064-70 (2008); Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979 1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001); Clarisa Long, Patent
Signals, 69 U. Clu. L. REV. 625, 626-27 (2002); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 58.
The consequences of these various explanations are considered in Part V.A, infra.
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To be sure, there may be some inventions that are so obviously
valuablein terms of their pure commercial value, their strategic
importance, their groundbreaking novelty, or all of the above - that
the applicant will file virtually any plausible claim she can think to
direct at them. For applications on these types of inventions, the interaction between prosecution costs and expected benefits may be of
little relevance to patent quality. However, prior work suggests that
such applications are an extreme minority.8 6 In the vast majority of
cases, the applicant has no particular reason to believe her claims are
exceptionally valuable, and so the marginal cost of additional claims
87
may very well be enough to dissuade the applicant from filing them.
If applicants can at least approximately detect the outer boundaries where an additional claim is unlikely to yield much benefit, 88
there will be some zones of claim scope where applicants will try to
avoid filing claims. One of these regions will be in an area that is perhaps of little interest to patent policymakers - the area where claims
are too narrow to be of any use (or concern) to anyone. But the other
region - where claims are too broad to be worthwhile - should be
particularly intriguing to people interested in improving patent quality. Applicants will not typically file such broad claims, based entirely
on their own self-interested prospects for enforcement. 89 If these
claims are rarely filed in the first place, the public will rarely bear any
cost of examining, opposing, or litigating them.
Of course, the fact some claims are too broad to be worth filing
does not imply that this outer boundary is currently set in the right
place or even that it secures any benefit not already provided by ex86. After all, estimates of the percentage of patents that produce any economic value
hover in the single digits, see Lemley, supra note 4, at 1501, 1507, and patents that produce
exceptional value that is identifiable at the application stage would necessarily be a subset
of those. See also Allison et al., supra note 69, at 461 n.1 11 (reporting conversation with a
general counsel who estimated that approximately three percent of his company's
applications are so valuable that "the sky's the limit" in prosecution fees).
87. See de Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra note 84, at 703-07.
88. And there is good reason to believe that they can. At a minimum, an applicant can
avoid filing claims that either read directly on known prior art or are patently indistinguishable from the prior art as a matter of law. See Cotropia, supra note 7, at 760; Kesan & Banik, supra note 8, at 52-53. Beyond these methods, an applicant can perform a basic prior art
search or literature review, if not to exhaustively rule out prior art then at least to estimate
the plausibility of her broadest claims. A more advanced applicant can carefully draft her
claims to avoid limitations that could easily be designed around, that are not necessary to
the functioning of the invention, or that limit the claims without adding any chance of further distinguishing the invention from the prior art. And every applicant can tailor her aggressiveness to her patent prosecution budget and the expected role of the given application
in her larger patent strategy. All of these techniques (with the possible exception of a proactive prior art search) are basic procedures for patent agents and attorneys. See RONALD D.
SLUSKY, INVENTION ANALYSIS AND CLAIMING 27-28 (2d ed. 2012); Cotropia, supra note

7, at 757-62, 760 n.186.
89. Again, this proposition assumes that the enforcement value of a claim is correlated
with the risk-adjusted litigation value of that claim. The effect of relaxing this assumption is
discussed in Part V.B, infra.
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amination. However, recognizing the possibility of such a region and
understanding how patent rules affect it are the first steps toward leveraging this boundary to improve patent quality.
B. The Presumptionof PatentValidity
Under existing law, the question of infringement and the question
of validity are given substantially different treatment in litigation. On
the infringement side, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that
the defendant is infringing her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Invalidity, by contrast, is an affirmative defense. 91 And, under the longstanding presumption of patent validity, a defendant
carries the burden of showing that the plaintiff's claim is invalid by
"clear and convincing evidence." 92 This burden is higher than a mere
preponderancemaking it easier, all else being equal, for claims
to
93
survive validity challenges than if there were no presumption.
Though the law regarding the presumption of patent validity is
clear, the magnitude of its effect in practice has proved difficult to
measure. 94 In the absence of further empirical research regarding the
presumption of validity, several basic assumptions are useful to this
Section's analysis.
1. Assumptions About the Presumption of Validity
In order to evaluate how the presumption of patent validity might
affect claiming behavior, this Section makes three assumptions about
how the presumption operates in practice. The first assumption is that
the presumption of validity does not end up doing any harm to the
patentee's cause. This assumption actually consists of two parts: First,
no claim has its likelihood of validity reduced by the presumption.
Second, and similarly, changing the standard for validity does not
90. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir.
1988). Although non-infringement is listed as a "defense" in the patent code, 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(b)(2) (2012), it is really an argument against the plaintiffs primafacie case, not an
affirmative defense on which the defendant must carry the burden of proof, see Roger Allan
Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 73 n.5 (2013)

(explaining this distinction).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
92. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242-43 (2011).
93. Recent statutory reforms may allow a challenger to proceed under the lower preponderance of the evidence standard through administrative challenges like post-grant or interpartes review. See AIA §§ 6(a), (d) (respectively codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e)
(2012)). These approaches present their own set of costs and benefits for challengers and
patentees. For a thorough discussion of these procedures, see Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
94. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 37, at 69. For an excellent empirical study on the
effect of the presumption on mock jurors, see David L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman,
Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. &

TECH. 429 (2013).
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reduce the odds that the claim will be found infringed. These two
parts are both intuitive and correct as a matter of law. Still, it is always possible that idiosyncrasies of the jury system could produce
counterintuitive (or counter-legal) results.
The second assumption is that at least some claims have their
likelihood of validity improved by the presumption. This assumption
would be true if, for example, a claim that would have been found
valid fifty percent of the time without the presumption has a better
than fifty percent chance of being found valid with the presumption.
There may be a similar effect, say, for claims that previously stood a
forty percent chance or a sixty percent chance of being found valid.
However, none of the following analysis depends on any particular
distribution of the presumption's effects. Like the first assumption,
this assumption is both intuitive and correct as a matter of law. If jury
instructions matter, then changing a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard to a "clear and convincing evidence" standard should have
some95effect in cases where validity otherwise would have been uncertain.
The third assumption is that the presumption of patent validity is
rebuttable. In other words, even with the presumption of patent validity, if a claim is too broad, it runs some non-trivial risk of being found
invalid. Like the first two assumptions, this assumption is correct as a
matter of law. 96 Moreover, there is direct evidence that this assumption is trueeven with the presumption of validity, claims are frequently found to be invalid.9 Although the presumption may increase
the likelihood that some claims will be found valid, it hardly renders
issued patents immune to validity challenges.
To summarize these assumptions: the presumption of patent validity increases the probability of validity for some claims, leaves it no
worse for others, and does not change the fact that the probability of
validity must decline at some point when claim scope becomes excessively broad. With these assumptions in place, it is possible to model
the effects that the presumption of patent validity has on applicants'
incentives when drafting claims.

95. Supporting this assumption, there is at least experimental evidence that changing the
standard of proof for validity can affect the decisions of mock jurors. See Schwartz & Sea-

man, supra note 94, at 459.
96. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
97. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 11, at 205; Mann & Underweiser, supra note 7, at
7 (approximately sixty percent of patents found invalid in Federal Circuit decisions between
2003 and 2009).
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2. The Effects of the Presumption of Validity
If the assumptions discussed above are true, 98 the basic properties
of the probability of validity as a function of claim scope remain the
same with or without the presumption: the probability still starts high
for narrow claims and falls as claim scope increases. However, the
presumption of validity causes the probability of validity to remain
higher for more claims as claim scope increases. Figure 3 illustrates
examples of the probability of validity both with and without a legal
presumption of validity.

-Probability
is
with
presumption

>claim
Evalid
0

-Probability
claim is
without

,0

2ovalid

presumption
V(s)

0_
Scope (s)

Figure 3: Probability of Claim Validity as a Function of Scope
The x-axis of Figure 3 is configured such that narrower claims are
on the left and broader claims are on the right. The y-axis ranges from
a probability of zero to a probability of one.
As Figure 3 illustrates, when the claim in question is extremely
narrow, the probability of it being found valid is high, with or without
the presumption.99 As the claim gets broader, both probabilities decrease. But, because of the presumption of validity, the probability
that the claim will be found valid is higher for some claims than it
would be without the presumption. Nonetheless, when the claim in
98. See supra Part JJI.A.1.
99. None of the following analysis depends on the particular shape of the probability
curves depicted by Figure 3.
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question is extremely broad, the probability of it being found valid is
low - again, either with or without the presumption.
Assuming that a loss due to invalidity and a loss due to noninfringement both have the same value to the patentee, 00 a claim's
expected value with the presumption of validity will be given by
Epv (s) = Vpv (s) x I (s),

(2)

where Epv(s) is the expected value of a claim entitled to a presumption of validity as a function of its scope (s), Vpv (s) is the likelihood
that a claim will be found valid given the presumption of validity as a
function of its scope, and I(s) is, as defined previously, the expected
infringement value of a valid claim as a function of its scope.
Equation (2) for expected claim value with a presumption of validity should look familiarit is structurally the same as Equation
(1) for the expected value of a claim without a presumption of validity. Indeed, under the assumptions made above, the basic features of
the expected value remain the same. As before, the expected value of
an issued claim peaks at neither extreme of claim scope. If a claim is
too narrow, its value is low because of the unlikelihood that it will
ever be infringed. On the other hand, when a claim is too broad - so
broad that the presumption of patent validity cannot salvage its overreach - the likelihood of it being valid is so low that the patent similarly has little enforcement value. Despite the presumption of validity,
the expected value of a claim still falls off as the claim becomes either
too narrow or too broad.
So what effect does the presumption actually have? Although the
basic shape of the expected value curve remains the same, the presumption of validity can potentially change the expected value at a
variety of points along the way.
To evaluate how the presumption affects claiming, consider the
following relationship between the presumption's effects on likelihood of validity and its effects on expected claim value. Let AV(s)
represent the improvement in a claim's likelihood of validity as a result of the presumption of validity as a function of its scope, such that
VPV(S) = V(s) + AV(s).

(3)

Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2), we obtain
Epv(s) = [V(s) + AV(s)] x I(s)
E

Epv(s) = [V(s) x I(s)] + [iSV(s) x I(s)],

(4)
(5)

and substituting Equation (1) into Equation (5), we obtain
Epv(s) = E(s) + [iSV(s) x I(s)].

100. For the consequences of relaxing this assumption, see Part 1II.D, infra.

(6)
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As a result, the improvement in a claim's expected value is given by
[AV(s) x I(s)] - the product of the improvement in the claim's likelihood of validity multiplied by the claim's expected infringement
value. In other words, the increase in a claim's value as a result of the
presumption depends on both the improvement the presumption
makes to the claim's likelihood of validity and the infringement value
of the claim.
It may be obvious that the presumption of validity only improves
the expected value of claims whose likelihood of validity is actually
improved by the presumption, that is, where AV(s) in the equation
above is greater than zero. The perhaps more subtle feature of the presumption of validity is that the degree to which it helps a given claim
also depends on the expected infringement value of that claim, I(s).
Even significant improvements in a claim's likelihood of validity - a
large AV(s) - will therefore be of little value to the applicant if that
claim has small infringement value.
The influence of infringement value gives the presumption of validity an inherent bias toward broader claims. Provided the infringement value of a claim tends to increase as a function of claim
scope,101 the presumption of validity will tend to offer greater improvements in expected value to broader claims than to narrower
ones.
To illustrate this effect, suppose the presumption helps all claims
uniformly on the question of validity, adding ten percent to the chance
that any given claim will be found valid (provided that the probability
can never be greater than one). 102 When this change in likelihood of
validity is multiplied by infringement value, the benefits of the presumption fall largely to broader claims. Figure 4 illustrates an example of expected claim value with and without a presumption of
validity, assuming the presumption yields a constant improvement to
the likelihood of validity across all claim scopes.

101. See supra Part JJJ.A (justifying this assumption).
102. This example merely illustrates the tendency of infringement value to skew the pre-

sumption's benefits toward broader claims. There is no reason to believe that the presumption of validity has this particular distribution of benefits to claims, nor is the resulting
analysis dependent on this choice of example.
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Figure 4: Expected Claim Value With and Without Presumption of
Validity
As Figure 4 illustrates, even a presumption of validity that affects
the validity of all claims equally has a larger effect on broader claims.
When AV(s) is constant, the improvement in expected value becomes
a direct product of the claim's infringement value. The broader the
claim, the greater the infringement value
and the greater the benefits
10 3
afforded by the presumption of validity.
This improvement in expected value may cause some claims that
would not have been worth filing without the presumption of validity
to become profitable as a result of the presumption. In the example
illustrated in Figure 4, without the presumption of validity an applicant would not want to file claims much broader than point B- approximately where the expected value of the claim crosses the claimfiling cutoff. But once the presumption of validity is in play, it makes
sense for this same applicant to file claims as broad as point D. As a
result of the presumption of validity, some broad claims that would
not have been worth filing without the presumption of validity may
become valuable enough to file. 1°4
103. Subject again to the caveats and assumptions stated in Part hI.A, supra.
104. In some cases, narrower claims, too, may become worth filing as a result of the presumption. As Figure 4 illustrates, for example, without the presumption an applicant would
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Note that the claims that become worth filing because of the presumption are not necessarily the claims getting the largest benefit
from the presumption. The increase in expected value changes filing
behavior only to the extent that it lifts a claim from below the claimfiling cutoff to above the claim-filing cutoff. Indeed, in the example
illustrated in Figure 4, many of the overbroad claims getting the largest expected value improvement from the presumption are still not
worth filing. The presumption of validity shifts, but does not eliminate, the outer boundary of claims with expected value exceeding
their expected costs.
Figure 4 highlights the significance of infringement value when
assessing the effects of the presumption of validity. But remember,
the increase in a claim's expected value as a result of the presumption
of validity depends on both the improvement in the likelihood of validity (AV(s)) and the expected infringement value (I(s)) of the
claim. Figure 4 is based on the somewhat conservative assumption
that AV(s) is constant as a function of scope. But this assumption
might not always be true. To the contrary, some commentators have
predicted that AV(s) will be largest for the kind of broad claims
whose probability is already in doubt. 10 5 After all, if a claim is almost
certainly valid, there may be very little work left for the presumption
to do. If this intuition is correct, it suggests that the presumption's
benefits for expected value will be even more dramatically skewed to
favor broader claims than the simple example illustrated in Figure 4
suggests. The claims most benefited by the presumption of validity
will be those with a real question of validity and that cover a large and
significant amount of potentially infringing commerce - almost certainly broader than claims that lack those attributes, and perhaps at
high risk of being the very kind of overbroad claims that reformers are
seeking to eliminate.
3. Assessing the Presumption of Validity
Two primary effects on applicants' incentives follow from the
changes to the expected value of claims predicted above. The first
effect is that applicants can expect more reward from participating in
the patent system- more inventions may justify the costs of filing
applications, more claims may be worth filing as a part of those patent
applications, and the net expected value of those claims may be greater than they otherwise would be. Since one purpose of the patent sys-

not want to file claims narrower than point A. With the presumption, claims as narrow as
point C have expected values that exceed the claim-filing cutoff.
105. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 37, at 58 (arguing that the presumption
disproportionately helps patents whose validity would otherwise be in doubt).
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tern is to reward invention,106 all these effects are generally considered
positive - subject, of course, to some limit. Holding all else constant,
future applicants can be exyected to file more claims and to obtain
more benefit for doing so.
The second effect is an increase in applicants' incentives to file
broader claims. The claims with the greatest improvement in expected
value will tend to be broader, and will very rarely be narrower. The
increased likelihood that these broader claims will be found validcoupled with the unchanged likelihood that they will be found infringed - creates pressure for an applicant to file broader claims than
she would have in the absence of the presumption.
However, these conclusions are based on an evaluation of the presumption of validity in isolation. Because the presumption shifts, but
does not eliminate the outer boundary of claims worth filing, it is possible that other features of the patent system may offset (or may be
adjusted to offset) the potential for increased incentives to file broader
claims that is created by the presumption of validity. The next Section
evaluates the effects that patent examination may have on counterbalancing the presumption of validity.
C. Substantive PatentExamination
In the preceding Sections, the cost of filing a claim was modeled
as being constant across all claim scopes. But it is possible that substantive patent examination may raise the expected cost of obtaining
certain weaker claims. If broader claims, for example, tend to be rejected more frequently than narrower ones, higher expected prosecution costs could reduce the appeal of filing such broad claims in the
first place.

106. See WARD

S. BOWMAN

JR.,

PATENT

AND ANTITRUST LAW:

A LEGAL AND

ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 2-3 (1973); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 621-24 (3d ed. 1990). Because rewarding
invention is currently the dominant justification given for the patent system, the following
discussion is framed around rewards. Similar trade-offs could be made with an eye to other
functions of the patent system. See, e.g., Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-Focused Patent
Policy (Oct. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfnabstract id=2481025 (evaluating the implications for the optimal breadth
and reliability of patent rights under a coordination -focused patent system).
107. This result is intuitive. Under the assumptions above, patent law was made unambiguously better for patentees, so it should come as no surprise that the value of seeking and
obtaining patents increased. In practice, of course, creating (or strengthening) a presumption
of patent validity may be accompanied by imposing more rigorous examination, higher
filing fees, or other additional costs that may balance out the incentive to file more patents.
The effect of such prosecution costs is evaluated in Part III.C, infra.
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1. The Effect of Substantive Examination on Expected Costs
If substantive patent examination functions as even a crude screen
against overbroad claims - that is, if the likelihood of a claim getting
rejected increases with claim breadth - then the expected cost of obtaining a claim will likewise increase as claim scope broadens. 10 8 Although an initial rejection is not a final determination of a claim's
validity, it may nonetheless serve an important function by increasing
the applicant's costs.10 9
More rejections could result in higher costs in one of several
ways. First, upon receiving a rejection notice, the applicant may undertake a potentially long and expensive battle with the USPTO in
order to secure the claim as it was originally filed. In such a case, the
cost of obtaining the broad claim will be substantially greater than the
cost of obtaining a narrower claim that would have been granted right
away. 110 Alternatively, upon receiving a rejection notice, the applicant
may undertake that same long and expensive battle with the USPTO
and ultimately lose. In that case, the cost of obtaining the overbroad
claim would be essentially infiniteno amount of investment in
prosecution could achieve its issuance.
Applicants have other options when a claim is rejected, but they
too are costly. For example, an applicant can narrow a rejected claim
by amendment, potentially conceding that the claim was too broad in
the first instance and retreating to a fallback position. This response
exacts a penalty in claim scope - both by the reduction in the literal
meaning of the claim and by the reduction of protection against
equivalents as a result of prosecution history estoppel."' She can cancel the claim entirely, which imposes the cost of not having the claim
at all. Alternatively, she can file a new claim, potentially even one that
is broader. But filing a new claim imposes additional prosecution
costs, and the applicant has no guarantee that the new claim will get
approved either. In sum, when rejection strikes, it is costly regardless
of the path the applicant chooses in response.
108. Cf Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 45, at 700 (noting that prosecution costs
increase as likelihood of invalidity increases); Fagundes & Masur, supra note 9, at 699-700
(same).
109. Cf Lemley, supra note 4, at 1527 (noting that examination, despite its limitations,
may serve a useful purpose by discouraging applicants from filing overbroad applications).
110. The cost of triggering protracted argument with the USPTO can be significant. In

2012, for example, the median reported attorneys' fees for a relatively complex reply to an
office action ranged from $ 2500 to $ 3000. The median reported attorneys' fees for taking
an appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ranged from $ 4000 to $ 7000. AM.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 27 (2013).

111. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722,

733-34 (2002) ("The doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial
alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be
created through trivial changes. [After narrowing the claim in response to rejection,] he may

not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter.").
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Applicants face expected prosecution costs that potentially increase with claim scope in a series of chunky steps. An additional
claim element may be enough to earn an applicant a prompt allowance, or it might make the difference between persuading a patent
examiner to allow the claim in an interview rather than requiring a
lengthy appeal. In advance, however, applicants do not typically know
precisely which claim expansions will trigger such a cost step. i 1 Instead, they know only that, in some range of claim scopes, the expected cost to obtain a claim will tend to increase as a result of
broader claiming. This effect, in turn, may raise the expected value
that a claim must have in order for the applicant to believe it worth
filing.

... ....... .......
.... ....

... ...

......... Claimfiling
cutoff
C(s)

Scope (s)

Figure 5: Claim-Filing Cutoff as a Function of Scope
Figure 5 depicts one example of how the minimum expected value for a claim to be worth filing might change as a function of its
scope. Within some range of narrow claims, the likelihood of an initial allowance is high, and thus the applicant's expected prosecution
costs are very near to the basic filing fees and drafting expenses. As
112. There are, of course, trivial examples in which an applicant would know exactly
where her prosecution costs are expected to jump - for example, when she drafts a claim
that reads directly on prior art of which she is aware.
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the scope of the claim gets broader, the likelihood of triggering a
longer and more expensive prosecution increases as well. In the extreme, a very broad claim may have essentially infinite expected prosecution costs, since no amount of lobbying, argument, or appeal will
be sufficient to obtain it. Thus, some broad claims that would have
been worth filing with flat prosecution costs will fall below a claimfiling cutoff that increases with claim scopethey are not worth
filing due to the increased expected prosecution costs imposed by
substantive examination.
2. Counterbalancing the Presumption of Patent Validity
In the example illustrated in Figure 4 above, the presumption of
patent validity increases the expected value of certain broad claims.
Holding prosecution costs constant, this increase in expected value
can cause some claims to be worth filing that would not have been
worth filing without the presumption. In the example illustrated in
Figure 4, adding a presumption of validity caused an applicant to shift
from filing her broadest claim near point B, to filing her broadest
claim near point D (these points are reproduced in Figure 6, below).
But suppose that the introduction of the presumption of validity is
accompanied by the advent of substantive patent examination, which
in turn causes the expected cost to obtain a claim to increase with
claim scope. If this patent screening function were implemented
properly, it could counterbalance applicants' incentives to seek broad
claims as a result of the presumption of validity.
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Figure 6: Expected Claim Value and Claim-Filing Cutoff as Functions
of Scope
As in Figure 4, the presumption of validity increases the expected
value of certain broad claims. But by adding substantive patent examination, the claim-filing cutoff for those claims is higher too. When
substantive patent examination is implemented correctly, it can counterbalance the increased value of those claims as a result of the presumption of validity. In the example illustrated in Figure 6, the
applicant would not want to file claims broader than point E- creating incentives to file her broadest claim at approximately the same
scope as if there were neither
substantive examination nor a presump113
tion of validity in force.
But the presumption of patent validity and the costly screening
function of patent examination do not leave applicant incentives exactly where they started. The combination of a presumption of validity
and an examination cost screen can increase the expected value of
claims of moderate scope. For example, claims that have intermediate
likelihoods of validity may receive some enforcement benefit from the
presumption of validity, yet avoid triggering the higher prosecution
costs that claims with very low likelihoods of validity would incur
under a substantive examination system. If coordinated correctly, the
113. However, note that the exact relationship between the expected value of a claim and
the claim-filing cutoff will depend on the value of the invention, the inventive step involved,
and other factors. See supra Part III.A. The example depicted in Figure 6 is merely for illustration; there is no reason to believe that, in practice, substantive examination and the presumption of validity will perfectly balance their effects on the broadest claim worth filing.
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combination of substantive examination and a presumption of validity
may thus be able to increase total inventor rewards without pushing
applicants toward broader claiming overall.
3. The Benefits of a Substantive Examination System
This interplay between the presumption of validity and prosecution costs that increase with claim scope is a potential reason for preferring a patent system with substantive examination and deferential
post-grant review to a simple registration regime. In a registration
system, patent applications are reviewed only for technical compliance with filing requirements, and not for the appropriateness of their
claims. 114 Without any substantive review of applicants' claims, the
expected cost to obtain a claim will be constant as a function of claim
scope. And typically, the unexamined claims that would be issued
under a registration system would not be entitled to a presumption of
their validity. 115
An examination system offers a discrete set of costs and benefits,
both public and private. Applicants must endure a costly examination
process, but in return are afforded a presumption of validity for the
claims that survive that process. That presumption may increase applicants' incentives to file broader claims, but ideally the costly screen
of examination counterbalances that pressure. The net effect of this
interplay is that a patent system operating under an examination model may be able to deliver greater rewards to patentees than would be
available under a simple registration system, without increasing incentives for applicants to file broader claims.
This synergy between costly substantive examination and the presumption of validity could serve as an alternative to the standard,
agency deference
justification
for the post-examination validity pre• 116
.
.
sumption. However, it is important to note that a substantive exam114. See Kieff, supra note 32, at 70-74 (evaluating comparative strengths and weaknesses of registration and examination systems); Lemley, supra note 4, at 1526-27. For a colorful account of an experiment of the young United States with a simple registration regime,
see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon
An Early Patent Controversy, 79 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 533 (1997).

115. See Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law
(with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
717, 740 & n.68 (2007); Michael J. Harbers, InternationalPatent Cooperation,20 STAN. L.
REV. 1000, 1003 (1968).
116. See Cathodic Pro. Serv. v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 594 F.2d 499, 505 (5th Cir.

1979) (noting that the presumption of validity "is founded on the understanding that patent
approval is a species of administrative determination supported by evidence"); Chi. Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452, 458 (7th Cir. 1975) (relating the pre-

sumption of validity to "the deference due to the technical expertise possessed by the Patent
Office and not generally possessed by federal judges"). Note that the presumption as it
currently exists cannot be entirely explained by agency deference, as the presumption applies even in cases where the agency did not have the proper evidence before it. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2249-51 (2011).
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ination process and a presumption of validity can each theoretically
exist without the other. 17 From the perspective of applicant incentives, each is a tool that could be used to adjust the expected cost and
value of an unfiled patent claim and therefore influence the kind of
claims applicants file.
D. Other Asymmetries in the Treatment of Validity and Infringement
The presumption of validity is a rather dramatic example of how
the rules for determining validity may depart from the rules for determining infringement. However, there are other, more subtle differences in the treatment of these questions. Specifically, collateral
estoppel principles may have different practical consequences for
losses on invalidity versus losses on non-infringement, and rules for
claim amendments may make it easier to narrow a claim after the fact
than to broaden it.
1. Re-Litigation of Validity and Infringement
In the preceding Sections, it was assumed that patentees were indifferent as between losing an enforcement suit on the basis of invalidity and losing on the basis of non-infringement. Both outcomes
were given a zero value, which is accurate when determining the value of a single round of patent litigation. Under U.S. law, however,
judgments of invalidity and judgments of non-infringement often have
different preclusive effects for future litigation, and so could be expected to have different values as outcomes to patentees contemplating multiple enforcement actions against a series of defendants.
On one level, invalidity and non-infringement judgments have the
same preclusive effects. Collateral estoppel is a doctrine of general
application - it merely prevents a party from re-litigating a question
that was fully explored and finally determined against it in a prior
litigation.118 If a question was not actually decided, or if the party
prejudiced by the court's answer was
not party to the prior litigation,
9
apply."
not
does
estoppel
collateral

117. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in HistoricalContext, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 953, 9981000 (2007).
118. Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) ("A court's judgment binds only the

parties to a suit, subject to a handful of discrete and limited exceptions."); 18A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4448 ("The
central proposition that a party is bound is balanced by the rule that ordinarily nonparties are
not bound. Some substantial justification must be found to justify preclusion of a nonparty.").
119. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
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However, in the context of a typical patent litigation, collateral
estoppel has drastically different consequences for adjudications of
validity and infringement. Collateral estoppel makes invalidity judgments particularly bad for patentees on enforcement campaigns because the same validity question is likely to be raised in each patent
lawsuit. If the patentee loses on validity even once, her ability to enforce that claim is over, since any subsequent defendant will be able
to invoke collateral estoppel. 12 And when the patentee wins on validity, that judgment in her favor will have little preclusive effect on future challengers, each of whom will have her own distinct opportunity
to argue invalidity. 121
The effects of collateral estoppel on determinations of infringement are more balanced. Because the infringement determination for
each successive defendant will often involve a different set of factual
issues, there will be many cases where collateral estoppel does not
even come into question. When it does, collateral estoppel will only
work to the slight advantage of defendants. As with validity, it will
never work against a newcomer defendant, since she must be given
one full and fair opportunity to advance her arguments. In the other
direction, when a prior non-infringement ruling is invoked against a
patentee, she will often have an opportunity to attempt to distinguish
the factual questions decided in the earlier case from those necessary
to dispose of the current one. A prior non-infringement ruling can be
helpful to a defendant, but it hardly provides the same assurance as a
prior invalidity ruling. 122
These asymmetric potential outcomes are summarized in Table 1
below.

120. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 332-34, 350; Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26
F.3d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Moreover, losing a validity challenge will even void
prior licenses and thus terminate existing royalty streams. See Michael Risch, Patent Challenges andRoyalty Inflation, 85 IND. L.J. 1003, 1024-25 (2010).
121. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329; Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The prior ruling may be given weight, see Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 711 (Fed. Cir. 1983), but a later determination that the claims are
invalid is entirely possible, see, e.g., Cedarapids, 5 F.3d at 1569-72; Stevenson, 713 F.2d at
712. The earlier validity judgment "serves only to inform the ... court... that caution must

be taken in reaching a contrary legal conclusion." Cedarapids, 5 F.3d at 1569. However, as
others have noted, non-mutual issue preclusion introduces the possibility of freeriding on
others' efforts to invalidate a troublesome patent, and may make it more difficult to organize
such efforts. See Miller, supra note 1, at 674.
122. See Miller, supra note 1, at 729-30. However, it is possible for findings that were
necessary to a non-infringement verdict to be used against a patentee in subsequent litigation, at least in certain situations. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 5 F.3d 514, 518 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The strongest
case, for example, would be one involving two identical products. If the first product has
been found not to infringe the patent, the patentee may be estopped from asserting that the
second (identical) product infringes the patent. See, e.g., Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Zenni
Optical Inc., 713 F.3d 1377, 1380-82 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Molinaro, 745 F.2d at 655.
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Table 1: Effect of Previous Judgments
Claim Previously Found:
Infringed
Not infringed
Valid
Invalid

Effect for Patentee in Later Litigation:
None / weakly positive
None / potentially negative
Weakly positive
Fatal

This asymmetry may have the effect of pushing applicants toward
narrower, more conservative claims. Because findings related to infringement are often of limited value (either offensively or defensively) for future litigations, they put comparatively less at stake for
patentees. Findings of invalidity, by contrast, have the potential to
destroy all of a claim's value. When there are multiple potential infringers of a patent, the owner of that patent will anticipate at least the
possibility of needing to bring multiple infringement suits. As a result,
she may prefer - all else being equal - to increase ....
the risk of losing
123
on infringement in exchange for better odds of winning on validity.
However, patentees have an important procedural countermeasure: joinder. When a court joins infringement claims against multiple
defendants into a single suit, it may make common pretrial rulings on
claim scope and validity, while leaving individualized infringement
determinations for each accused product or process for trial. 124 In this
way, a patentee can obtain multiple infringement determinations while
risking only a single determination of validity. At the limit, aggressive
joinder of accused infringers could blunt the caution-inducing effects
of collateral estoppel, moving patentees toward a state of indifference
as to the reason for any given loss.
For reasons largely aside from claim scope, joinder of patent defendants is already a matter of controversy. 12 5 Until recently, there
was a split among district courts on what standard applied to the permissive joinder of defendants in patent suits, with some courts presumptively allowing the joinder of unrelated defendants alleged to
infringe the same patent, and other courts denying joinder unless there
was some relationship among the various defendants' allegedly infringing acts. 12 6 In response, the AIA preempted the ordinary joinder
123. However, the costs and benefits of each potential form of loss are complex. For example, even though the typical patent holder has more to lose on the validity front, there are
a variety of reasons that defendants may be reluctant to bring validity challenges, see infra
notes 211-12, which may push applicants back in the direction of broader claims.
124. See, e.g., In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
125. David 0. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 652, 689-92 (2013).
126. See also Taylor, supra note 125, at 678-89 (summarizing the split). Compare
MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456 (E.D. Tex. 2004), and Sprint
Commc'ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Kan. 2006), with Androphy
v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (N.D. Ill. 1998), Philips Elecs. N. Am.
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rules applicable to accused infringers, making it more difficult for
patentees to join defendants into a single infringement suit. 127 Although it does not
appear that
application quality was
. ..
.. improving
. patent
128
a motivation for this particular provision, to the extent it increases
the frequency with which patentees must withstand repeated validity
challenges, it may increase incentives for applicants to claim more
conservatively.129
2. Procedural Preferences for Narrowing Amendments
The model presented above describes the incentives facing applicants as they file and prosecute their initial claims in the USPTO.
However, there are also a variety of procedural options that allow for
the addition and amendment of claims after a patent has initially issued. These post-grant procedures are consistently more lenient toward narrowing (as opposed to enlarging) amendments, which may
add value to broader claiming in the first instance.
The rules for reissuing a patent provide a stark example. At any
time during the life of a patent, the patent's owner may apply for reissuance to correct the mistake of having "claim[ed] more or less than
he had a right to claim in the patent."130 This latitude, however, is subject to an important caveat. Reissues to enlarge the scope of claims
3
1
may be filed only in the first two years after a patent is granted.1
132
time.
any
at
filed
Reissues to reduce the scope of claims may be
This preference for narrowing claim amendments is rooted in the
conventional, adversarial view of patent prosecution, in which it is
presumed that applicants will seek to obtain the broadest claims possible while the USPTO tries to push them back. 13 3 Under this view, a
patentee's expansion of her patent's scope will potentially cause public harms, while her reduction of the scope will presumably lead to

Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415, 417 (D. Del. 2004), and Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp.,
No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, *2-*3 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 12, 2011).
127. See AIA § 19(d) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012)); Taylor, supra note 125, at
692-706. The Federal Circuit has since weighed in on the standard for joinder in pre-AlA
suits as well. See Inre EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
128. See Taylor, supra note 125, at 700-07 (summarizing legislative history).
129. Cf Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Patent Trolls, Limiting
Joinder, 25 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 673, 691 (2012) (observing that a stricter joinder rule will
require more caution in litigation on the part of patentees).

130. 35 U.S.C. §251(a) (2012).
13 1. Id. § 251 (d).
132. See id.
133. See Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 354 (1881) (noting that when Congress

passed the original reissue provision, "[i]t was probably supposed that the patentee would
never err in claiming too little"). The soft "reasonableness" time limit on enlarging reissues
set out in Miller was replaced by a strict two-year cutoff in the Patent Act of 1952. See Act
of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 808 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 25 1(d) (2012)).
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public benefits. 134 So the former option is time-limited, while the latter is preserved.
But from the view of applicant incentives in the USPTO, this procedural asymmetry increases the value of obtaining broader claims in
the first place. The broader the claim, the greater its option value as a
vehicle for future narrowing amendments. In this way, an overly
broad claim is better than an overly narrow claim, since the former
enables a later reissue to get scope right while the latter does not. And
other vehicles for post-grant modification of claim scope are
similarly
13 5
biased across the board in favor of narrowing amendments.
While procedural preferences for post-grant narrowing amendments may create some incentives to seek broader claims in the first
instance, it is important to note that patentees have other procedural
tools to achieve the same result. In the case of particularly valuable
inventions, for example, it is common practice to file a series of continuation
applications
to preserve the option of filing additional claims
•
136
in the future. The incentive effects of asymmetric amendment rules
may therefore be blunted by the option of simply filing a continuation.
However, if reforms are implemented to reduce this use of continuation practice, 137 applicants may respond by seeking broader claims in
the first instance as an alternative means to preserve their claim modification options.
Based on these understandings of how existing patent rules affect
incentives to file particular kinds of claims, the next Part proposes
several reforms that could be expected to push applicants in the direction of filing higher quality claims.
IV. REFORMS FOR IMPROVING PATENT QUALITY
Before proceeding, it is important to note that improving the quality of the claims filed in the USPTO is not a goal to be pursued at all
costs. The purpose of the patent system, after all, is to foster innovation and encourage inventive activity, not simply to ensure applicants
do not obtain invalid claims. If it were the latter, solving the patent
quality crisis would be easy. Policymakers could simply discourage
patent filing altogether- drastically increasing filing fees, vitiating
the infringement rules to disfavor patentees, and so on. As the benefits
134. See Miller, 104 U.S. at 355-56.
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (only narrowing amendments permitted during ex parte
reexamination); id. § 316(d)(3) (same for inter partes review); id. § 326(d)(3) (same for
post-grant review).
136. Allison et al., supra note 69, at 458; Lemley & Moore, supra note 24, at 68.
137. See, e.g., Lemley & Moore, supra note 24, at 105-18 (suggesting reforms that
would reduce, but not abolish, the use of continuation applications); Gary C. Ganzi, Patent
Continuation Practice and Public Notice: Can They Coexist?, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 545, 600-03 (2007) (recommending reforms to continuation practice).
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of filing applications decrease, the number of such applications (good
or bad) could be expected to decrease as well. In the extreme, one
certain way to end the current crisis in patent quality would be simply
to repeal the patent statutes altogether.
The true challenge of improving patent quality is to do so in a
way that preserves the rewards available for obtaining high-quality
patents while reducing the allure of low-quality ones. An analysis of
proposals to change applicants' incentives to file broad claims, then,
should also take into account how those proposals will affect the costs
and benefits of participating in the patent system in the first place.
Two policy assumptions inform the following discussion. The
first policy assumption is that the patent system would be improved if
patents tended to issue with narrower claims. The second policy assumption is that the rewards available to inventors should be preserved at or near their current level. In other words, the goal of these
reforms is to encourage narrower claiming while leaving the total incentives to file patent applications unaffected.
Of course, these particular policy goals are neither universal nor
inevitable. How much reward to provide to inventors and where on
the spectrum of claim breadth that reward should be provided are both
complex questions at the very core of patent policy. 138 But because
analysis of these larger questions is beyond the scope of this Article,
these goals are taken as assumed objectives. In any event, the following analysis of how patent rules could be used to reduce incentives to
file broad claims while maintaining the total level of inventor rewards
under the patent system is instructive for designing policies with different goals as well.
This Part proceeds in four Sections. Sections A and B relate to
ways to improve the cost-screening function performed by filing fees
and examination, respectively. Section C proposes a change to patent
litigation rules that could encourage applicants to file narrower
claims. Section D examines the viability of using post-examination
penalties to affect applicant claim-filing behavior.
A. RationalizingApplication Fees
As discussed above, 13 9 the cost of filing a claim can serve as an
important backstop that may screen against some of the lowest-value
claims, If claims were free, an applicant could stake a claim at nearly
every point of the claim value curve, hedging against miscalculation
and ensuring that she files at least one claim at or near the peak.
138. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 80-92 (2009) (discussing theories underlying the patent system); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 10, at 873-74.
139. See supra Part JJI.A.2.
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Without some cost constraint, there would be no reason to avoid filing
extremely broad or extremely narrow claims, since there is always a
chance that one of those claims might turn out to be valuable.
An important component of the cost of filing claims is the fees
paid to the USPTO. 14 The basic filing fee allows an applicant to file a
limited number of claims; after reaching that limit, each additional
claim costs between $80 and $500 in additional fees. 14 1 Although
those numbers may seem small, the cost of filing additional claims
can add up quickly. For example, an application may contain several
embodiments of the same invention, and the applicant may seek to
differentiate those embodiments from the prior art on multiple dimensions. These individually modest surcharges for extra claims, multiplied by several embodiments and multiple attempts to differentiate
from the prior art, can become significant in the aggregate. 142 Thus,
while any single failed claim may cost the applicant only a trivial
amount of marginal filing fees, a practice of filing excessive claims
can dramatically increase the applicant's costs with few offsetting
benefits. And, indeed, prior empirical work has observed a relationship between
the magnitude of USPTO fees and the behavior of patent
143
applicants.
One way to increase the screening effect of filing fees would be
to raise them across the board. Such a change could be expected to
have two distinct benefits: First, it would cause applicants to choose
their claims more carefully, thereby reducing the number of invalid or
140. Other components of the cost of filing a claim include inventor time and attorneys'
fees. However, it is difficult to predict how these costs relate to the quantity or the scope of
claims filed, or how changes to patent policy could change those relationships. Therefore,
the following analysis focuses on the fees paid to the USPTO for each claim filed.
141. The basic filing fee includes the right to file up to twenty claims. Each additional
claim incurs a charge of $ 80. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(i) (2013). Moreover, the basic filing fee
permits the applicant to file just three independent claims. Each independent claim in excess
of three incurs a charge of $ 420. Id. § 1.16(h). These charges are additive, so an applicant
who files her twenty-first claim that is her fourth independent claim faces $ 500 in additional fees. Id. §§ 1.16(h)-(i). Discounts ranging from fifty percent to seventy-five percent are
available for small entities, universities, and independent inventors. See id. §§ 1.16, 1.27,
1.29 (defining categories of applicants eligible for fee reduction). For ease of exposition, the
following discussion refers to the rates an applicant would pay assuming she does not qualify for these discounts.
142. Consider an applicant who pursues a strategy of filing four additional independent
and eight additional dependent claims beyond the threshold of claims that are worth filing.
In applications in which she has already used all of her free claims, she owes $ 500 for each
of her excess independent claims and $ 80 for each of her excess dependent claims. The
resultant increase in her filing fees - $ 2640 - amounts to a more than twenty percent
increase in prosecution costs in the context of an $ 11,000 patent application. See supra note
9. For a corporation filing hundreds of applications a year, the cost of this strategy could be
significant.
143. See Crouch, Evidence Based Prosecution: Sensitivity to Claim Fee Variation, supra
note 84; Crouch, Sensitivity to USPTO Fees, supra note 84 (reporting fifteen percent drop in
total number of claims filed after the USPTO increased filing fees for each additional claim
over twenty claims from $ 18 to $ 50); de Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,
supra note 84, at 703-07.
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unimportant claims cluttering the technological landscape. Second,
14 4
provided the USPTO retains the funds it collects from applicants,
increased filing fees would allow the office to invest more resources
in examination and therefore make fewer mistakes.
But this change would come with two downsides as well: First,
higher application fees would discourage filing of both broad and narrow claims, and may on the whole actually push applicants in the direction of more aggressive claims. 14 5 Second, increased fees would
reduce the net expected value of all claims - even the strongest, most
valuable claims that will be filed despite the higher fees. Without
some offsetting benefit to applicants, the expected rewards for invention are decreased, as may be overall participation in the patent system. Increasing the cost of filing each additional claim may be
beneficial within some range, but it is also possible to increase fees
to
14 6
a point that is counterproductive to the goals of the patent system.
An alternative way to increase the screening effect of filing fees is
to ensure that that screen does not have any holes. And here, the current fee schedule leaves clear room for improvement. Presently, the
$1600 basic filing fee includes the right to file up to twenty claims at
no additional charge. 147 Not only is there no surcharge for claims two
through twenty, but also there is no benefit conferred for filing any
fewer than twenty claims. As a result, there may be some cases where
an applicant files additional claims even though
she does not expect
148
them to have any significant value whatsoever.
Another non-linearity in the current fee schedule flows from the
distinction between independent and dependent claims. 14 9 The current
schedule imposes only a modest charge for dependent claims, while
144. In principle, the USPTO is entitled to keep the fees it collects, see 35 U.S.C. § 42
(2012), although history suggests that this financial independence may be periodically
weakened during times of government austerity. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the
PTO's GrantingPatterns,66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 77-78 (2013).
145. This scenario could occur, for example, if increased application fees predominantly

pushed narrower claims below the claim-filing cutoff, while broader claims remained above
the cutoff.
146. See Thomas, supra note 36, at 743 (noting that increasing costs of patent filing may
push inventors toward the alternative of trade secret protection and reduce the rate of innovation); Wagner, Patent-QualityMechanisms, supra note 6, at 2165.
147. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2013) (establishing "basic fee for filing" of $ 280, "search
fee" of $ 600, and "examination fee" of $ 720, as well as an additional surcharge for claims
in excess of twenty).
148. See Crouch, Evidence Based Prosecution: Sensitivity to Claim Fee Variation, supra
note 84 (observing filing pattern that suggests that applicants tend to file all twenty claims
included with the basic filing fee). The applicant may, however, incur additional agent or

attorneys' fees by filing each additional claim.
149. A dependent claim is one that incorporates by reference all of the limitations of another claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF
PATENT

EXAMINING

PROCEDURE

§ 608.01(n),

at

600-129

to

-137

(2014),

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-0600.pdf. Therefore, a dependent claim
is always at least as narrow as the claim that it incorporates.
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exacting a significant premium for an application containing more
than three independent claims. After an applicant has used up all her
claims included in the basic filing fee, an additional dependent claim
150
is just $80, compared to $500 for an additional independent claim.
In some range, then, the marginal filing fee can be more than six times
greater for some claims than it is for others.
Because every claim must either be independent or ultimately depend on an independent claim, and because independent claims are
expensive, applicants have an incentive to reuse independent claims
as many times as possible. This fee structure encourages applicants to
draft broad, top-level independent claims to use as a base, and then to
branch various dependent claim families off that base.1 51 The independent claim premium is so high that it often makes sense to use this
technique even if it means filing an independent claim that would not
be cost-justified on its own.

Dep. Claim #1

Dep. Claim H2

Dep. Claim tt3

D

E

F

I
Dep. Claim 4
G
Figure 7: Claim Organization Minimizing Applicant's Fees
Figure 7 illustrates one way a patent applicant could organize her
claims to take advantage of the discount for dependent claims. Independent Claim #1 (containing claim elements A, B, and C) rests at the
top of the claim family tree. Three dependent claims depend directly
from Independent Claim #1: Dependent Claim #1 (incorporating
claim elements A, B, and C from Independent Claim #1 and adding
element D); Dependent Claim #2 (incorporating claim elements A, B,
and C from Independent Claim #1 and adding element E); and De150. See supra note 141.
151. This technique is well known and commonly practiced among patent prosecutors.
See, e.g., DAVID PRESSMAN, PATENT IT YOURSELF 240, 245 (15th ed. 2011).
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pendent Claim #3 (incorporating claim elements A, B, and C from
Independent Claim #1 and adding element F). Another dependent
claim, Dependent Claim #4, depends on Dependent Claim #3 (incorporating claim elements A, B, and C from Independent Claim #1 and
element F from Dependent Claim #3, and adding element G).
In the example illustrated in Figure 7, Independent Claim #1
(shaded gray) is too broad to be worth filing on its own. 152 The various dependent claims (shaded white), however, are sufficiently narrow to be worth filing. With the approach illustrated in Figure 7, the
applicant has one independent claim and four dependent claims. Under the current fee schedule, adding these claims to an application
would cost $820.153
A competing claim drafting strategy is illustrated in Figure 8.

Ind. Claim #1

Ind. Claim #2

Id. Claim #3

A, B, C,D

A, B, CE

A, B,C, F

Dep. Claim #1
G

Figure 8: Claim Organization Without Fee Minimization
Figure 8 illustrates a different way the same applicant could organize her claims. Rather than relying on an overly broad independent
claim as a base for the claims she would actually like to file, the applicant has split her claims into separate families of claims that are
individually worth filing. Three independent claims now stand alone:
Independent Claim #1 (containing claim elements A, B, C, and D);
Independent Claim #2 (containing claim elements A, B, C, and E);
and Independent Claim #3 (containing claim elements A, B, C, and
152. That is, the claim's expected value is so low that it would not be worth even the
price of filing as a dependent claim if not for its function as a base for other dependent
claims.
153. These examples illustrate the case of an applicant who has already used the three independent and twenty total claims included with the basic filing fee. The additional independent claim results in a charge of $ 500, and each dependent claim results in a charge of
$ 80, for a total of $ 820 in additional fees. See supra note 141.
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F). A single dependent claim, Dependent Claim #1, depends on Independent Claim #3 (incorporating elements A, B, C, and F from Independent Claim #3 while adding element G).
In the example illustrated in Figure 8, all of the claims (shaded
white) are worth filing on their own merits. The applicant has not filed
any overly broad independent claims to use as a base for filing other
claims. With the approach illustrated in Figure 8, the applicant has
three independent claims and one dependent claim. Under the current
fee schedule, adding these claims to an application would cost
$ 1580.154
A comparison of the examples illustrated in Figures 7 and 8 reveals the perverse incentives potentially created by the current fee
schedule. In the approach illustrated in Figure 7, the applicant has
filed one more claim than she did in the example illustrated in Figure
8. And, importantly, the additional claim in the Figure 7 is overbroad
and would not be worth filing if it had to stand on its own merits. Still,
because of the extreme cost differences in filing independent versus
dependent claims (nearly half-price fees for this aspect of her application), the applicant has a direct financial incentive to include the overbroad claim. 155
Both of these features of the fee schedule - the discount for dependent claims and the right to file up to twenty claims without incurring any additional charge per claim- appear to be the product of
previous attempts to align filing fees with the burden that examining
an application will put on the USPTO. 156 Because of overhead costs
such as reviewing other sections of an application, identifying and
retrieving the most likely sources of prior art, and other administrative
tasks, it may very well take an examiner about as long to evaluate an
application with several claims as it does to evaluate one with only a
single claim. For their part, chains of dependent claims are easier to
review because they impose a certain logical hierarchy on the application. An examiner can direct her search at the narrowest claim in a
dependent claim branch. If she can identify prior art that makes that

154. See supra note 141.

155. Whether written as an independent or dependent claim, each claim is a legally distinct invention that may present independent questions of validity and infringement. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
156. Indeed, the current framework of filing fees appears to have been implemented with
examination burden in mind. When the rule that an applicant could include three independent and twenty dependent claims at no additional charge was first enacted in 1982, the
House report noted that the bill included "provisions for increasing the filing fees due to
increased complexities presented by certain applications, e.g., applications containing more
than a specified number of claims." H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 5-6 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 765,769.
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claim unpatentable,157she can reject all the broader claims in the branch
on the same basis.
While the current fee schedule may get applicant incentives right
to facilitate cost-effective examination, it is inconsistent with using
filing fees as a screen for improving patent quality. After all, each and
every claim, whether dependent or independent, whether the only
claim in an application or one of many, stands on its own for purposes
of both validity and infringement. 5 8 The public interest in discouraging applicants from filing overly broad claims is the same for all
claims, regardless of how they happen to fit into the structure of the
larger application.
The solution to both of these problems is straightforward: impose
a flat fee for each claim an applicant files, regardless of how that
claim relates to other claims or the total number of claims in an application. Rather than charging a large upfront fee for filing an application with a number of claims included at no extra charge, and rather
than charging a premium for independent claims, the USPTO could
charge a lower upfront fee and a more significant, flat fee for each
claim filed. The per-claim fee could be designed to leave the current
average total filing fees paid by applicants approximately unchanged.
For example, if a typical application today includes thirty claims, five
of which are independent (total filing fee of $3240),59 an upfront fee
of $500 plus $90 per claim would leave the average total filing fees
nearly unchanged (total filing fee of $3200).160 Because each claim
would cost exactly the same amountwithout regard to the total
number of claims in an application or whether the claim is dependent
or independent - this reformed fee structure would render filing fees
a more consistent cost screen against low-value claims. And notably,
under the AlA, the USPTO now enjoys the authority to rebalance this
fee schedule on its own; however, so far, the USPTO has used this
authority to exaggerate these discrepancies rather than repair them. 161
To be sure, there may be important examination efficiencies
achieved by having applicants organize their claims into hierarchical
157. However, it is not clear that examiners actually give dependent claims such scrutiny.
See Michael Risch, Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARv. J.L. & ThCH.
179, 197 (2007).
158. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
159. In this example, the applicant must pay the basic filing fee ($ 1600), see supra note
147 and accompanying text, plus $ 80 for each of the ten claims in excess of twenty ($ 800)
and $ 420 for each of the two independent claims in excess of three ($ 840), see supra note

141.
160. This example merely illustrates the reformed fee structure's effect on one hypothetical application.
161. See AIA § 10. In its initial round of fee setting, the USPTO increased the basic filing
fee by twenty-seven percent, the cost for each independent claim by sixty-eight percent, and
the cost for each claim in excess of twenty by twenty-nine percent. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4224-25 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts.

1,41-42).
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families based on one or more independent claims. Without some incentive to draft dependent claims, applicants might draft only independent ones, potentially increasing the work that must be done by
patent examiners. Therefore, there may be an argument for preserving
the distinction in filing fees between dependent and independent
claims, though perhaps at less dramatic levels. A smaller discount for
dependent claims might be enough to encourage applicants to organize their claims into families when appropriate, but without inducing
as many overbroad base claims.
B. Penalizing Amendments and Abandonment
One way to discourage applicants from filing overbroad claims is
to make broader claims more expensive. If the examination system
causes the expected cost of obtaining a claim to increase with claim
scope, broader claims will become less attractive,
,- 162 while narrower
claims will become comparatively more appealing.
Under current prosecution rules, the penalty for having a claim rejected is small. Although rejection can lead to increased costs through
the process of argument and appeal, those costs will only be incurred
if the applicant persists in seeking the rejected claim. Applicants always have the option of simply cancelling any rejected claims and
proceeding with the allowed ones. The maximum penalty imposed,
16 3
then, is the loss of any filing and prosecution costs already incurred.
One way to increase the expected cost of filing overbroad claims
would be to require applicants to post a completion bond for each
claim filed. This bond would be returned to the applicant when the
claim issues. It would be forfeited, however, when the claim is cancelled or amended. 1 64 The effect of this bond would be to make it
more expensive to cancel or amend a claim, thereby increasing the
expected cost of filing broad claims. The cost of a granted claimeither upon first examination or after some process of argument or
appealwould remain unchanged. By raising the cost of filing a
162. See supra Part III.C.
163. However, cancelled claims may impose a penalty in the form of prosecution history
estoppel. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722,
735-41 (2002); Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1134
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). However, because Festo estoppel only affects a patentee who
ultimately asserts the doctrine of equivalents, see 535 U.S. at 735-41, the deterrent effects
of this estoppel are likely small. For a proposal to deter overbroad claiming by increasing
the force of prosecution history estoppel, see Wagner, supra note 5, at 216-26.
164. Given the pressure to file quickly under the new first-to-file system, see AIA § 3
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), it might make sense to offer an initial grace
period before the completion bond penalties kick in. For example, applicants could be allowed to cancel or amend their claims without forfeiting their bonds during the first year of
their applications' pendency, or perhaps until substantive examination of the claims has
begun. The benefits of this flexibility for applicants would need to be weighed against the
costs imposed by its additional administrative complexity.
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claim that should rightfully be rejected, a completion bond requirement could be expected to push applicants in the direction of filing
higher quality claims. 165
Another potential consequence of such a bond might be that applicants will persist in arguing for debatable claims longer than they
would in the absence of a bond. As long as there is a chance of persuading the examiner (or the Patent Trial and Appeal Board) of the
claim's merits, the expected cost of pursuing such arguments would
be reduced by the possibility of earning back the bond. Therefore, in
addition to producing higher quality claim filings, a completion bond
requirement might also produce more protracted argument and review
of claims closest to the line of patentability. 166
While more frequent argument and appeals may strike some as
expensive and undesirable, they may actually be an additional benefit
of a completion bond requirement. Reduced incentives to file broad
claims means fewer examiner resources spent challenging plainly unpatentable claims. More frequent arguments and appeals regarding
rejected claims means more intense scrutiny of those claims that are
close to the line. Indeed, a common call for patent reform involves
triaging the work
of the USPTO, providing
different levels of review
•
167
depending on the nature of the claim. A completion bond requirement - which could lead to higher quality claim filings from the beginning and more careful review of those that are more
questionable - could be one mechanism for organically transitioning
to such a system.
C. Replacing the Presumption of Validity with a Presumptionof
Infringement
As discussed above, 168 the presumption of validity has two primary effects on applicant incentives: First, it increases the rewards inventors can expect to obtain by participating in the patent system. Second,
it provides those rewards at least in part by encouraging applicants to
file broader claims than they otherwise would.
One way to improve the quality of claims filed would be to simply repeal the presumption of validity. This repeal could be expected to
have mixed effects. On the one hand, it would reduce the expected
165. Other scholars, too, have proposed penalties for claim amendments. See Wagner,
Patent-QualityMechanisms, supra note 6, at 2167468. This concept is in some ways similar
to the examination -stage bounty proposed by John R. Thomas. See Thomas, supra note 1, at
340-44.
166. Cf Wagner, Patent-Quality Mechanisms, supra note 6, at 2167.
167. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 5, at 10-11; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 42, at 8485; Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 37, at 61463; Meehan, supra note 1,
28-43; Osenga,
supra note 1, at 141-51.
168. See supra Part I.B.
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value of broader claims. On the other hand, it would also reduce the
appeal of participating in the patent system altogether. Under the policy goals assumed above, the former would be a benefit, the latter an
unintended consequence.
However, there is another alternative. Rather than simple repeal,
the presumption of validity could be replaced with a presumption of
infringement. Such a presumption of infringement could have two
distinct benefits: First, it could increase the value of narrow claims as
compared to broad ones. Second, it could make up some of the inventor rewards lost from repealing the presumption of validity.
A presumption of patent infringement would be similar to the
presumption of validity, in that it would shift the burden of proof on
one of the central questions arising in a typical patent litigation. Rather than carrying the burden to prove invalidity, patent defendants
would carry the burden to prove their own non-infringement. Of
course, infringement is not (and would not be) evaluated by the
USPTO in advance. 69 In order to prevent potential abuse, patentees
would likely need to make some threshold showing (for example, a
"substantial likelihood" 1 ) that a specific product infringes a specific
claim to trigger the presumption.
Upon this showing, noninfringement would become an affirmative defense like invalidity is
today, to be proven by the accused infringer by clear and convincing
evidence. The presumption of infringement would be rebuttable, and
defendants might be able to regularly overcome this presumption, just
as current defendants regularly overcome the presumption of validi17
ty. 2

So what effect would a presumption of infringement have on applicant incentives? Assuming that losses due to invalidity and losses
due to non-infringement are of equal value, 173 a claim's expected value will now be given by
Epi(s) = V(s) X Ipi(s),

(7)

169. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 701, at 700-6 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep0700.pdf (noting that patents are examined for validity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103,
and 112).
170. Cf 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2012).
171. This preliminary showing could also address a concern recently articulated by the
Supreme Court that a patent holder is in a better position to point out, at least initially,
which product infringes which claim of the patent. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family
Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014) (declining to shift burden of infringement in declaratory judgment context).
172. For the following analysis, it is assumed that the presumption of infringement could
be implemented in a way such that it (1) increases the likelihood of infringement for at least
some claims and does not decrease the likelihood of infringement for any claims, (2) does
not affect the likelihood (one way or the other) that any claim will be found valid, and (3)
does not prevent at least some claims from being found non-infringed despite the presumption. Cf. supra Part I.B.1.
173. See supra Part I1D.
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where Epl (s) is the expected value of a claim entitled to a presumption of infringement as a function of its scope (s), V(s) is the likelihood that a claim will be found valid as a function of its scope, and
Ipi (s) is the infringement value of a valid claim entitled to a presumption of infringement as a function of its scope.
Like the presumption of validity, the presumption of infringement
changes the expected value of a variety of claims. 17 4 Let AI(s) represent the increase in a valid claim's infringement value as a result of
the presumption of infringement as a function of its scope, such that
Ipi(S) = I(s) + Al(s).

(8)

Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (7), we obtain
Epi(S ) = V(s) x [I(s) + A/(s)]
E

Ep(s) = [V(s) x I(s)] + [V(s) x A/(s)],

(9)
(10)

and substituting Equation (1) into Equation (10), we obtain
Epi(s) = E(s) + [V(s) X Ai(s)].

(11)

As a result, the improvement in a claim's expected value is given by
[V(s) x Ai(s)] - the product of the claim's likelihood of validity
multiplied by the increase in the claim's infringement value. In other
words, the increase in a claim's value as a result of the presumption of
infringement would depend on both the improvement that the presumption makes to the claim's infringement value and the claim's
existing probability of validity.
Like the presumption of validity, a presumption of infringement
could be expected to increase the total expected benefits available to
an inventor participating in the patent system. But the presumption of
infringement benefits a different kind of claim than does the presumption of validity. The claims that are most benefited by a presumption
of infringement will have two characteristics: First, there will be some
doubt as to whether they are infringed (that is, AI (s) is large). Second,
they will be narrow enough to have a significant likelihood of being
valid (that is, V(s) is large). While it may be difficult to predict how
the improvement to infringement value will be distributed, claims
with high probabilities of validity are by definition high quality
claims. 17 5 So while the presumption of validity tends to skew its benefits toward broader claims of dubious validity, 176 a presumption of
infringement favors higher quality claims. 17 7 If applicants care about
174. The logic here is the converse of that described in Part JJ.B.2, supra.
175. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
176. See Figure 4 and accompanying text.
177. This argument is a generalization and is admittedly vulnerable to counterexamples.
For example, there may be certain broad claims with large improvements to infringement
value (large Al(s)) that will enjoy a large increase in their expected value despite having
low likelihoods of validity (small V(s)). The claim is only that behind a veil of ignorance
about the distribution of the improvement to infringement value, the presumption of in-
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enforcement outcomes,1 78 this shift in presumptions can be expected
to lead17to9 narrower, higher quality claims being filed in the first instance.

This result is intuitive. Under the presumption of validity, patentees have protection against over-claimingto prevail on an argument that an asserted claim is too broad, a patent defendant must show
invalidity with clear and convincing evidence. Patentees are much
more vulnerable to under-claiming, since the burden is on them to
show that the defendants actually infringe the claim. 180 Replacing the
presumption of validity with a presumption of infringement would
invert this logic. Instead, patentees would be protected against underclaiming, but comparatively more vulnerable to over-claiming. Anticipating the possibility of litigation, applicants will play to their
strengths and away from their weaknesses - in this case, by investing
more of their prosecution resources in narrow claims as opposed to
broad ones.
One potential risk of a presumption of infringement is that it may
tend to broaden the effective scope of a claim beyond what it would
have been without the presumption. In this way, the effective broadening caused by the presumption itself may offset any success this
policy has in moving applicants toward facially narrower claims.
However, careful design of the threshold for triggering the presumption could reduce (and perhaps eliminate) this potential for effective
broadening. If patentees are required to meet a sufficiently high likelihood-of-infringement threshold to trigger the presumption, the presumption's effects could be limited to cases where there was already a
colorable infringement claim without the presumption. If the presumption has an only weak effect on dubious infringement arguments,
then the degree of effective re-broadening may be negligiblethough admittedly, this risk raises questions in need of further study.
To be sure, introducing an entirely new litigation presumption has
many potential costs and benefits, 181 and a full treatment of the desirability of such a presumption will be the subject of a subsequent pro-

fringement can be expected to have a larger effect on claims with higher likelihoods of
validity than on claims with lower likelihoods of validity. The actual distribution of the
improvement to infringement value will greatly depend on the design of the presumption,
and thus is the subject of later work.
178. For a discussion of applications with no interest in enforcement, see Part V.A, infra.
179. However, replacing the presumption of validity with a presumption of infringement
will likely affect inventor rewards differently for different kinds of inventions. Cf. Ford,
supra note 90, at 105-07 (noting differences in information asymmetries depending on the

form of infringement).
180. See supra Part JJ1.B.2.
181. For example, it is possible that a presumption of infringement could lead to increased rates of patent litigation. On the other hand, evidence relevant to the question of
infringement is more likely to be found in the hands of defendants, so shifting the burden of
production may have the offsetting benefit of reducing the cost of patent litigation overall.
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ject. But it is worth noting that a limited presumption of patent infringement is already available under existing law. By statute, a patentee alleging infringement of a process patent based on the importa182
importation, sale, or use of a product made by that process
must
only establish a "substantial likelihood" of such infringement. Upon
this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the product was not made by the infringing process. 183 So presumptions of
infringement are not an entirely untested concept, and could have the
benefit of reducing applicants' incentives to file broad claims while
increasing their incentives to file narrow ones.
D. Penalizing Invalid Claims After Examination
Section B introduced the possibility of using application-stage
penalties to influence the kinds of claims applicants file. For completeness, it is worth noting that additional deterrence of overbroad
claiming could be achieved through monetary penalties 184
for claims that
are found to be invalid at some point after examination.
Imposing a penalty for a claim that is invalidated after issuance
changes the model presented above in an important way. Rather than
a claim that is found to be invalid having no value, it instead has a
negative value. The magnitude of that negative value is equal to the
invalidity penalty. Therefore, a claim's expected value is reduced to
account for the possibility that the claim will require the applicant to
pay the penalty. This adjusted expected value is given by
EF(s) = [V(s) x I(s)] - [V(s) x F],

(12)

where EF (s) is the expected value of a claim that might require the
applicant to pay a penalty as a function of its scope (s), V(s) is the
probability of a claim being invalid as a function of its scope, 185 and F
is the penalty
a patentee must pay if she is caught with an invalid
18 6
claim.
182. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012).
183. Id. § 295. Additionally, to invoke the presumption the patentee must overcome cer-

tain procedural obstacles. Specifically, she must show that she "has made a reasonable effort
to determine the process actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so
determine. " Id.; see also Creative Compounds, LLC v. Starmark Labs., 651 F.3d 1303,
1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (shifting the burden of infringement where the requirements of 35

U.S.C. § 295 had been met).
184. See Kesan, supra note 1, at 795-97; Miller, supra note 1, at 705; Wagner, PatentQuality Mechanisms, supra note 6, at 2170-72.

185. The likelihood of a claim's invalidity is simply the complement of the likelihood of
its validity, that is, [1 - V(s)].
186. This relationship is true provided that the claim actually issues. To focus on the effects of the penalty, the following discussion assumes no substantive examination or that the
risk of any claim being permanently rejected is small. Under a functioning examination
system, of course, the application -stage deterrent effect of the penalty would need to be
discounted by the possibility that an applicant will be "saved" from paying the penalty by
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Figure 9: Expected Claim Value With and Without Invalidity Penalty
As Figure 9 illustrates, the expected values of all claims are reduced to some degree by the imposition of an invalidity penalty.
Whenever the risk of invalidity is greater than zero, the chance of the
penalty will reduce the expected value of a claim by some amount
[V(s) x F]. At narrow claim scopeswhere the likelihood of a
claim being invalid is low - this reduction in expected value will be
small. However, as claim scope increasesand the likelihood of
invalidity increasesthe reduction in expected value as a result of
the penalty becomes more significant. Holding the claim-filing cutoff
constant, applicants will file fewer broader claims than they would if
not for the penalty. In this way, an invalidity penalty operates like
other changes in legal rules that reduce the expected value of broader
claims.
However, there is one feature of the invalidity penalty that is different from any of the legal rules so far discussed: its ability to cause
the expected value of a claim to actually become negative. Without
penalties for invalidity, any issued claim with some chance of validity
(no matter how small) will have an expected value greater than zero.

receiving a rejection from the USPTO. This result is one of the paradoxes of a postexamination penalty - its application-stage deterrent effect is actually reduced as examination improves.
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That creates the possibility that either a hole in the cost screen 187 or a
particularly valuable invention could cause applicants to file claims
even if they were very unlikely to be valid. When the expected value
of a claim becomes negative, however, this cost screen is no longer
necessary to prevent the filing of low-value claims. Beyond that point,
the risk of having to pay the penalty is sufficient to deter applicants
from filing such broad claims.
An invalidity penalty does not just cause a claim's expected value
to become negative; it causes that expected value to cross zero at a
specific likelihood of validity that a patent policymaker can control.
Recall from Equation (12) that the expected value of a claim subject
to an invalidity penalty F as a function of its scope is given by
EF(s) = [V(s) x I(s)] - [V(s) x F],
where V(s) is the probability of a claim being invalid as a function of
its scope. Replacing V(s) in Equation (12) with the equivalent
[1 - V(s)], we obtain
EF(s) = [V(s) xI(s)] - [[1 - V(s)] x F]

(13)

= EF(s ) = [V(s) xI(s)] - F + [V(s) x F].

(14)

Setting EF(s) = 0 in Equation (14) and rearranging, we see that the
expected value of a claim is zero when
F= [V(s) x I(s)] + [V(s) x F]

(15)

-F = V(s) x [I(s) + F],

(16)

which is satisfied when
VJ(S
V(

-

-

F

l+(17)

In other words, the likelihood of validity at which the expected
value of a claim becomes negative is determined by the relationship
between the infringement value of the claim and the penalty for invalidity. For example, if a policymaker wants to ensure that no claims
with an expected likelihood of validity of less than fifty percent are
filed, she should set the invalidity penalty to equal the enforcement
value of the claim against all potential infringers. In that case, setting
F = I(s) in Equation (17), the expected value of a claim crosses zero
when V(s) = 0.5, and applicants would be expected to avoid filing
claims with likelihoods of validity below that threshold. Or, as another example, if a slightly more forgiving policymaker wants to set the
zero crossing at claims with a likelihood of validity of less than thirtythree percent, she should set the invalidity penalty to be half the enforcement value of the claim against all potential infringers. In that
case, setting F = 0.5 x I(s) in Equation (17), the expected value of a
187. See supra Part IV.A.
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claim will cross zero when V(s) = 0.33, and applicants would be
expected to avoid filing claims with likelihoods of validity below that
threshold.
These penalties are large- potentially hundreds of millions of
dollars charged to the patentee after she loses a validity challenge. 188
However, it is not surprising that such large penalties would be necessary to turn a patent from a net asset to a net liability at some point in
claim scope. For the risk of an invalidity penalty to singlehandedly
offset the upside potential of a successful infringement suit, the penalty would need to be approximately the same order of magnitude as the
infringement value. So, while penalties can theoretically create an
independent screen against low-value claims, this feature is not enabled until those penalties become quite large.
Moreover, another obstacle may further limit the usefulness of
penalties for adjusting applicant incentives in the USPTO. If litigation-stage penalties are to create application-stagedeterrence against
overbroad claiming, there must be some limits on how applicants may
cancel or amend their claims down the road. Otherwise, an applicant
could simply file overbroad claims in the USPTO and cancel them if
invalidating prior art is discovered at some point in the future. Similarly, if the penalty only affects patentees whose claims are found invalid in litigation commenced by the patentee, the threat of the
penalty can be mooted by simply not asserting the claim.
As long as applicants and patent holders have the option of cancelling, amending, or at least not litigating their claims at some point
between their initial application and the courthouse steps, the possibility of a litigation-stage penalty is unlikely to serve much deterrent
effect at the application stage. These tools may be useful for influencing behavior at later stages, 189 but they are not promising candidates
for adjusting applicants' incentives in the USPTO.
V. REFINING THE MODEL
The previous Parts of this Article presented a model of the incentives facing patent applicants. That model worked on the basis of several assumptions, and as a result may not describe the full range of
behavior demonstrated by applicants in the USPTO. This Part presents and responds to several potential objections to the arguments
and assumptions made above. Specifically, Part A analyzes the incentives facing applicants who file for reasons other than licensing or
188. However, prior commentators have proposed bounties of potentially similar magnitude. See Miller, supra note 1, at 711-20 (proposing bounty equal to patentee's past profits
from practicing the invention).
189. For example, they may be useful in discouraging patentees from maintaining or asserting questionably valid claims post-issuance.
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enforcing their issued patents. Part B considers how deviations between settlement and expected litigation outcomes could affect claiming behavior. Finally, Part C evaluates how value derived from a
patent's role in a larger patent portfolio could affect the prior analyses.
A. Some Applicants Have No Intention of Enforcing Their Patents
The previous analysis operated on the assumption that applicants
seek to maximize the future enforcement value of the claims they are
filing in the USPTO. This assumption is certainly true for some applicants, but it is also certainly not true for all applicants.
Legally, a patent grants its holder the right to exclude;1 90 yet, it is
difficult to explain the sheer volume of patent applications by legal
rights alone. Fewer than two percent of issued patents are ever mentioned in a federal district court, and only a tiny fraction of those are
actually litigated to judgment. 191 Of course, those numbers understate
the total percentage of patents that are privately asserted, since some
patents are licensed without a complaint being filed. No one really
knows how many patent disputes are resolved this way, but a leading
estimate is that the number is approximately five percent. 92 Even
with generous rounding of these estimates, it appears safe to say that
the great majority of issued patents are never litigated, licensed, or
otherwise asserted.
This puzzle - why do so many people file so many patents that
are never brought to bear on potential infringers? - has been the subject of discussion among commentators. A simple answer is that while
it is unlikely that any single patent will turn out to be both valid and
significantly infringed, the payout from obtaining just one such patent
justifies many failed attempts. 93 This phenomenon has been dubbed
the "lottery ticket" explanation of patent filing - inventors file large
numbers of patents in hopes of striking gold on a few of them. 194 So
while the odds of enforcing any single patent are low, inventors nonetheless file frequently in hopes that some will turn out to be worthwhile.
An alternative explanation for why firms file patents they, in all
likelihood, will never enforce is rooted in the maxim that "the best
defense is a good offense."'1 95 Firms that are operating in an area
190. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2012); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
191. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1501.
192. See id. at 1507 & n.53.
193. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
194. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 42, at 81.
195. For discussions of defensive patenting behavior, see Graham & Sichelman, supra
note 85, at 1065; Lemley, supra note 4, at 1504-05.
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where they will likely encounter competitors' patents may find that
having patents of their own can help secure their own freedom to operate. For example, if Company A holds a patent (or portfolio of patents) that can foreclose a particular product market, the only way
Company B may be able to continue to participate is to secure a patent
(or portfolio of patents) that is equivalently capable of foreclosing
Company A from the market. Facing the prospect that both companies
will be locked out of the market, the theory goes, Company A and
Company B will enter a cross-licensing agreement, giving each the
ability to compete in the market despite the other's foreclosing patents.1 96 For applicants like these, patent litigation might only be considered as a last resort. Provided that other industry participants are
cross-licensing and otherwise going along peacefully, they would be
quite content - and might well prefer - to let their own patents 97
live
out their issued life without ever seeing the inside of a courtroom.
However, both of these reasons for patenting share a common intermediate goal: to preserve the option of enforcing the issued patent
should circumstances evolve to make enforcement desirable. And so
even applicants like these - those who may not expect or even hope
to someday litigate their issued patents - will have an eye on maximizing the potential enforcement value of their claims. The "lottery
ticket" applicant and the "freedom-to-operate" applicant both maximize the strategic value of their applications 1when
they obtain claims
98
with the highest expected enforcement value.
Yet as other scholars have observed, there is a limit to how much
patenting behavior can be explained by the possibility of enforcement.
For example, Clarissa Long has noted that patents may perform an
important signaling function. 199 At an individual level, issued patents
may reflect the significance of an engineer's accomplishments, her
value to the organization, and her potential usefulness to competitors.
Indeed, it is common for inventors to list their issued patents on their
resumes, and many corporations reward inventors with cash bonuses,
public honors, and eligibility for certain promotions. 2 00 Even without
196. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex PatentEcosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 299, 308-10
(2010).
197. But see id. at 333-34 (noting the ineffectiveness of defensive patenting as protection

against non-practicing entities).
198. It is possible that the "freedom-to-operate" patentee may be more narrowly focused
on claims that her competitors - or at least her patent-holding competitors - will be likely
to infringe. But given the difficulty of predicting exactly what any given firm will be doing
years down the road, broad claims are still likely to maximize the leverage that any given
patent can provide in negotiations with a patent-holding competitor.
199. See Long, supra note 85, at 636-37.
200. See Richard S. Gruner, CorporatePatents: Optimizing OrganizationalResponses to
Innovation Opportunitiesand Invention Discoveries, 10 MIARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 30
(2006); Lemley, supra note 4, at 1506; Jessica Silbey, Patent Variation:Discerning Diversity Among PatentFunctions, 45 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 441, 454-56 (2013).
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such material rewards, many inventors may simply want the satisfaction of seeing their name on an embossed, issued patent. 20' And at a
corporate level, issued (or even pending) patents may signal that a
company invests in research and development and that it is protecting
its intellectual property. 202
If issued patents are ends unto themselves, then some applicants
may be indifferent to the enforcement value of their patents. 203 An
engineer seeking prestige, a company wishing to attract investors, an
inventor hoping to call herself a patenteeall are drawn to the
recognition carried by a patent, rather than its attendant legal rights.
As such, they may not care whether their patents are actually valid,
provided their patents look good enough to the group for whom these
patent signals are intended.20 4
But with indifference to validity likely comes indifference to
claim scope as well. There is no obvious reason why an applicant
seeking only a trophy for her wall or a number for an investor report
would value a claim with one scope over anotherand particularly
no obvious reason why she would prefer broad claims over narrow
ones. To the applicant lacking any interest in enforcement, the value
of an issued claim may very well be constant as a function of scope.
It is not clear how an applicant who is truly indifferent to enforcement will draft her claims. One possibility is that she will draft
them essentially randomly, hoping that at least one of them will be
granted by the USPTO and result in an issued patent. But another possibility is that she will seek to minimize the time and cost spent in
prosecution. In this case, even a very weak examination screen may
be sufficient to push this type of applicant toward narrow claims. 205 If
the cost of obtaining an issued claim increases with scope, but the
benefits to the applicant do not, then such an applicant can be expected to draft her claims narrowly- minimizing prosecution costs
and increasing the chances of obtaining a patent as swiftly as possible.

201. See William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REv. 369, 373 (2011); Lemley, supra note 4, at 1506.
202. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1505-06; Long, supra note 85, at 636-37, 647-55.
203. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1514.
204. See id. at 1514-15.
205. Cf id. at 1527 (noting that even imperfect examination may serve a socially useful
function by discouraging applicants from filing overbroad claims).
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Figure 10: Expected Cost of Obtaining a Claim as a Function of
Scope and Scope-Neutral Value
Figure 10 illustrates an example of a claim-value function that is
invariant across all claim scopes, along with an expected cost to obtain a claim that increases with claim scope. At narrow claim scopes,
the benefit to the applicant of obtaining a claim far exceeds the cost of
obtaining that claim. As claim scope increases, the expected cost to
obtain the claim rises as well, but the benefits to the inventor do not.
Therefore, this type of applicant could be expected to file claims on
the narrower side of the spectrum, where the gap between the value of
having a patent and the cost of obtaining it is the greatest. Assuming
examination plays even a weak screening function,
claims will
• . narrow
.
206
tend to offer the fastest, cheapest route to an issued patent.
Of course, some inventors and start-ups may want to signal their
inventive prowess not only by their number of issued patents, but also
by some metric of those patents' values. In other words, applicants
with no intention of enforcing their patents may still have an interest
in obtaining enforceable patents simply because their employers, investors, or potential acquirers do. In that case, their behavior may be
more like the behavior of the applicants described in Parts III and IV,
supra.
206. However, current patent rules may be failing to screen overbroad claims filed by
these types of applicants. The basic filing fee includes the right to file up to twenty claims,
and there is no penalty for canceling a rejected claim. See supra note 79; supra note 147 and
accompanying text; supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Finally, it is possible that some applicants have no intention of
enforcing their patents, but desire claims that are facially as broad as
possible. This might be the case if, for example, broader claimsenforceable or notwere thought to signal greater inventive
achievement. Of course, pursuing overbroad claims as a signal of
prowess risks damaging the inventor's own credibility, 20 7 but it is possible that some inventors are willing to take this risk. This particular
group of applicants - to the extent that they become a concern for
policymakers - will likely respond more strongly to increases in the
expected cost to obtain broad claims than to reductions in their expected enforcement value. 208
B. Enforcement Outcomes May Divergefrom Expected Litigation
Outcomes
The previous analysis assumed that the enforcement value of a
patent was based on the likelihood and value of potential litigation
outcomes. However, there is a growing concern that many patent settlements today do not accurately reflect expected litigation outcomes. 2 09 Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether (and how) a
divergence between settlement value and litigation value could affect
applicants' incentives in drafting claims.
The classic example of patent settlements diverging from expected litigation outcomes is the nuisance suit. In this paradigm, a
patentee brings an extremely weak or even frivolous case against an
accused infringer. The accused infringer knows that she has an excellent chance of prevailing at trial, but because of the high costs of patent litigation, she pays a small settlement to avoid the expense of
doing so. 2 10 Thus paid off, the patentee moves along the line to the
next dubiously accused infringer.
It is not immediately clear how this divergence between patent
settlements and expected litigation outcomes affects the values of individual claims to patentees. For example, if a claim's nuisance value
is independent of its scope, then the possibility of nuisance suits may
207. See Long, supra note 85, at 649-50.
208. Presently, it is unclear whether there exists a significant number of these signalingfocused applicants who desire broad claims without regard to their enforceability. The frequency with which applicants seek patents with truly no interest in enforcement, and the
behavior of such applicants during the course of prosecution, are ripe fields for further
study.
209. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual

Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 516-20 (2003) (describing the rise of opportunistic patent litigation premised upon raising claims that defendants know they would win on
the merits, but nevertheless settle because litigating them would be more costly); Ranganath
Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 161462, 171 (2009).

210. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 9, at 697-98; Sudarshan, supra note 209, at 16164.
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not have any effect on an applicant's incentives to file a marginally
broader or narrower claim. Instead, a more general topic for consideration is whether this divergence affects some kinds of claims differently than it affects other kinds.
One theory proposes that the divergence between settlements and
expected litigation outcomes is greater for asserted claims that are
overbroad than for asserted claims that are not infringed. This theory
relies on the assumption that it costs a defendant more to defend on
grounds of invalidity than it does to defend on grounds of non211
infringement.
If this assumption is true, then a defendant facing a
claim that is very likely invalid may pay more to avoid trial than a
defendant facing a claim that is very likely not infringed would pay.
And, thereforeall else equalapplicants may prefer broader
claims to narrower ones to exploit this larger divergence between settlement values and expected litigation values for overbroad claims.
To be sure, comparing the costs of invalidity defenses with the
costs of non-infringement defenses is difficult, and some commentators have observed reasons for which a defendant may actually prefer
to make arguments of invalidity over arguments of noninfringement.212 Additionally, one must consider the costs of counter
ing each defense from the perspective of the patentee. It is possible
that the risk of losing a claim to an invalidity judgment counterbalances any cost advantage that patentees may have when it comes to
litigating that issue. 213
But, if the divergence between settlements and expected litigation
outcomes tends to be greater for broader claims than for narrower
ones, then this divergence may be an additional factor that pushes
applicants toward filing broader claims. In that case, stronger examination or other cost-based reforms may be necessary to counterbalance these incentives to file more broadly.

211. One reason that invalidity may be the more expensive defense is that defendants
typically have better and more timely access to the evidence that is determinative of infringement. See Ford, supra note 90, at 104-07.
212. For example, infringement may involve a much larger volume of evidence, and is
not typically amenable to cost-sharing through joint defense agreements. See Sudarshan,
supra note 209, at 185-86. The comparison is further complicated by the fact that invalidity
judgments may lend an unearned advantage to the defendant's competitors in a way that
non-infringement judgments do not. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 1, at 952. For a thorough discussion of the desirability of each defense from the perspective of defendants, see
Ford, supra note 90.
213. As discussed above, judgments of invalidity typically have a more harmful preclusive effect for patentees than do judgments of non -infringement. See supra Part III.D. 1.
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C. Even Invalid PatentsHave Portfolio Value
The previous analysis was based on a particular patent's value for
purposes of either signaling 214 or enforcement. 215 However, there is
another possibility: a large portfolio of patents could have significant
signaling or enforcement value, even if some (or many) of those patents are not likely to have much of either type of value on their
own. 216 If the high cost of litigating even a single patent can cause
settlement outcomes to diverge from expected litigation outcomes,
then the threat of asserting hundreds or thousands of patents could
cause settlement outcomes to diverge even more significantly. An
applicant pursuing a portfolio enforcement strategy might therefore be
more interested in obtaining a large number of patents, rather than
maximizing the enforcement value of those patents individually. 217
The ability of large portfolio owners to extract undeserved royalties may signal problems with current patent rules. However, it is not
clear why a portfolio-based licensing strategy would lead to a preference for overbroad patents over narrow patents with a low likelihood
of infringement. In the portfolio-based licensing paradigm, a portfolio
derives its value from the holder's ability to bring a long tail of patent
infringement suits, even if only a few (if any) of those suits turn out to
be winners. Winning is obviously better for the portfolio holder, but
even losses are not so bad given a large enough portfolio. As between
losing on grounds of invalidity and losing on grounds of noninfringement, portfolio holders would seem to prefer to lose on noninfringement, since a loss on non-infringement preserves the holder's
ability to assert the patent against another potential licensee in the
future. By contrast, a finding of
invalidity effectively takes the patent
218
out of the assertable portfolio.
Moreover, a portfolio-focused prosecution strategy may actually
lead applicants to seek narrower claims than they would if they were
evaluating the value of their patents individually. A shift toward portfolio-based licensing and enforcement creates pressure for applicants
to seek a large number of low-cost patents. 219 But this shift does not
have to mean pressure to obtain low-quality patents. With an examination screen working properly, the cheapest way to obtain lots of
issued patents may be to simply file lots of narrow claims. In this way,
portfolio-building applicants may look a lot like signaling-focused
applicants, pursuing strategies that will yield the greatest number of
214. See supra Part V.A.
215. See supra Parts III, IV.
216. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 58, at 66.
217. See id. at 42; Wagner, Patent-Quality Mechanisms, supra note 6, at 2155. See generally Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities,63 DUKE L.J. 89 (2013).
218. See supra Part III.D.1.
219. See Chien, supra note 196, at 338.
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issued patents for their prosecution dollar. 22 0 Thus, increasing the effectiveness of the examination cost screen may push portfoliobuilding applicants in the direction of narrower claims that are more
likely to be valid. A functioning examination cost screen could help
transform market pressures to pursue a large number of cheap patents
into applicant incentives to seek narrow ones.
VI. CONCLUSION
Patent applications do not file themselves. Behind each application is an applicant who has invested substantial time and resources
into seeking patent protection. The decisions of that applicant can
have a significant effect on the costs that must be spent examining and
opposing that application, as well as on the quality of the patent that
ultimately issues.
This Article has noted several ways in which existing patent rules
affect applicants' incentives to file narrow or broad claims. It has also
suggested several changes to those rules that could push applicants in
the direction of filing higher quality applications. Undoubtedly, there
are other ways that existing rules affect claim drafting and other reforms that could further align applicants' incentives with those of the
public. A greater emphasis on the role of applicants in improving patent quality could lead to better patents without requiring additional
investment in examination or intervention by third parties.

220. See supra Part V.A.

